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1403 
A SECOND BITE AT THE APPLE: FEDERAL 
COURTS’ AUTHORITY TO COMPEL 
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO 
GOVERNMENT AGENTS IN ACCESSING 
ENCRYPTED SMARTPHONE DATA UNDER 
THE ALL WRITS ACT 
Abstract: On February 29, 2016, in In re Order Requiring Apple, Inc. Assist 
in Execution of Search Warrant (“In re Apple, Inc.”) the U.S. District Court 
for the Eastern District of New York held that the All Writs Act did not pro-
vide the legal authority to require Apple Inc. to bypass the encrypted lock-
screen passcode of an iPhone for the federal government in order to execute a 
search warrant. Accordingly, the decision, which was the first of its kind, 
stripped the government of an investigative tool upon which it had routinely 
relied since as early as 2008. In In re Apple, Inc., after years of acquiescence 
to such orders, Apple mounted its first challenge to the propriety of the All 
Writs Act and courts’ authority to compel the company to bypass its own en-
cryption for the government. This position followed from Apple’s most recent 
efforts to provide tighter mobile security for its customers with the rollout of 
iOS 8 in October 2014, which offered more extensive full-disk encryption by 
default—so extensive, Apple claimed, that its previous assistance to the gov-
ernment is no longer technologically feasible. As a result of the newly en-
hanced encryption law enforcement officials across the country have encoun-
tered hundreds of lawfully searchable phones with no means of executing 
searches. This Note provides a discussion of the underlying legal implications 
surrounding the heated public debate that has emerged in the wake of In re 
Apple, Inc. and other similar cases as well as the practical challenges en-
hanced data encryption creates for law enforcement officials. Particularly, it 
focuses on the propriety of decryption assistance orders that have been issued 
under the All Writs Act. It argues that the decision in In re Apple, Inc. was in-
correct, and that the All Writs Act does in fact confer authority to federal 
courts to compel third-party assistance in certain situations. It concludes by 
offering an expansion of the Communication Assistance to Law Enforcement 
Act as one potential solution to the threat that impenetrable device encryption 
poses to the functioning of the American criminal justice system. 
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INTRODUCTION 
If you own a smartphone with a lock-screen passcode, you most likely 
use encryption or at least have the option to turn it on.1 The extent to which 
that encryption is secure depends on a myriad of factors, most notably the 
device and its operating system.2 Full-disk encryption, once an underappre-
ciated and underutilized security feature available for smartphones, has pro-
liferated in recent years.3 Its increasingly widespread use as a default fea-
ture on newer devices is flooding the market with phones designed to be 
impenetrable when locked.4 Since October 2014, versions of Apple’s iOS 
and Google’s Android, which collectively comprise over ninety-six percent 
of the worldwide operating-system market share for smartphones, have 
supported encryption capabilities originally believed to be impossible to 
circumvent without the owner’s passcode.5 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See, e.g., Sarah Wilson, Compelling Passwords from Third Parties: Why the Fourth and 
Fifth Amendments Do Not Adequately Protect Individuals When Third Parties Are Forced to 
Hand Over Passwords, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 7–8 (2015) (noting that the increased societal 
reliance on mobile computing and digital storage has sparked demand for more sophisticated en-
cryption technology); Matt Appuzzo et al., Apple and Other Tech Companies Tangle with U.S. 
Over Data Access, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2015), http://nyti.ms/1UCWAgf [https://perma.cc/XG4N-
TNQ6] (discussing the increased demand for built-in cellphone encryption modes available for en-
crypting digital communication and data stored on cellphones); Andrew Cunningham, Phone and 
Laptop Encryption Guide: Protect Your Stuff and Yourself, ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 23, 2015, 1:00 
PM), http://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2015/08/phone-and-laptop-encryption-guide-protect-your-stuff-
and-yourself/1/ [https://perma.cc/C75P-BQN8] (discussing methods available for encrypting digi-
tal storage on various smartphones offered by Google, Microsoft, and Apple). 
 2 See Cunningham, supra note 1 (discussing the effectiveness of comparable full-disk encryp-
tion operating systems offered by Google, Microsoft, and Apple as of August 2015); Ryan Radia, 
Why You Should Always Encrypt Your Smartphone, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 16, 2011, 11:00 PM), 
http://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2011/01/why-you-should-always-encrypt-your-smartphone [https://
perma.cc/WBF4-BNJA]. 
 3 See Cunningham, supra note 1 (noting the prevalence of mobile operating systems that 
support full-disk encryption); Radia, supra note 2. Full-disk encryption is largely considered one 
of the most secure cryptosystems available for data stored on electronic devices. See Radia, supra 
note 2. Available in the form of both hardware and software, full-disk encryption converts every-
thing on the hard drive, including the operating system, into an unreadable form until the phone’s 
password is entered. See Wilson, supra note 1, at 7–8. 
 4 See Appuzzo et al., supra note 1 (discussing new encryption on Apple and Android phones); 
Joseph Menn et al., Apple’s War with the FBI Could Speed up the Developments of Government-
Proof Tech, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 24, 2016, 7:02 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/r-apples-fight-
with-us-could-speed-development-of-government-proof-devices-2016-2 [https://perma.cc/YLT7-
XJ67] (discussing the emerging market for smartphones specifically designed to thwart snooping 
governments, criminals, and corporate rivals, such as BlackPhone, RedPhone, and the BlackBerry 
Priv). 
 5 See Cat Zakrzewski, Encrypted Smartphones Challenge Investigators, WALL STREET J. (Oct. 
12, 2015, 7:36 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/encrypted-smartphones-challenge-investigators-
1444692995 [https://perma.cc/U543-EJC4]; Press Release, Gartner, Gartner Says Worldwide 
Smartphone Sales Grew 9.7 Percent in Fourth Quarter of 2015 (Feb. 18, 2016), http://www.gartner.
com/newsroom/id/3215217 [https://perma.cc/L9JR-8G43]. 
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The new enhancements in device encryption are creating significant 
problems for law enforcement personnel, however, who are increasingly 
obtaining warrants to search the smartphones of criminal suspects and hom-
icide victims with no means of executing those searches.6 In the past, Apple 
had regularly assisted law enforcement officials in bypassing the passcodes 
of seized phones in response to a valid court order and search warrant.7 That 
assistance, Apple claims, is no longer an option with updated phones be-
cause the newer encryption is designed to make it impossible for anyone, 
even company technicians, to access a locked phone without the passcode.8 
Additional security features, such as automatic data-wiping protocols, may 
nullify many alternative methods of hacking into phones.9 
Collectively, these newer impediments effecting law enforcement’s 
ability to access stored data represent the most recent installment in a larger 
issue colloquially referred to as “Going Dark.”10 Generally, the term refers 
to the evolving gap between the government’s authority to conduct criminal 
investigations and the ability to exercise that authority in light of technolog-
ical advancements.11 Enhanced encryption has reignited a simmering debate 
                                                                                                                           
 6 See KRISTIN FINKLEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44187, ENCRYPTION AND EVOLVING 
TECHNOLOGY: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. LAW ENFORCEMENT INVESTIGATIONS 6, 7 (2016); 
Zakrzewski, supra note 5 (discussing investigators from across the country encountering prob-
lems). 
 7 See FINKLEA, supra note 6, at 6; Jason M. Weinstein et al., Privacy vs. Public Safety: Pros-
ecuting and Defending Criminal Cases in the Post-Snowden Era, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 729, 744 
(2015). 
 8 See FINKLEA, supra note 6, at 5–7; Daisuke Wakabayashi, Apple’s Evolution into a Privacy 
Hard-Liner, WALL STREET J. (Feb. 23, 2016, 8:59 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/apples-
evolution-into-a-privacy-hard-liner-1456277659?mod=pls_whats_news_us_business_f [https://perma.
cc/5AE2-M74C]. 
 9 See FINKLEA, supra note 6, at 8; Orin Kerr, Opinion, Preliminary Thoughts on the Apple 
iPhone Order in the San Bernardino Case (Part 1), WALL STREET J. (Feb. 18, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/02/18/preliminary-thoughts-
on-the-apple-iphone-order-in-the-san-bernardino-case-part-1 [https://perma.cc/L7A8-4CWS]; see 
infra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing the auto-erase function available on iPhones and 
the protection that function provides against brute-force forensic techniques). 
 10 E.g., FINKLEA, supra note 6, at 8–9 (discussing the evolution of the “going dark debate,” 
which originally centered on law enforcement’s ability to intercept real-time communication, but 
has since extended beyond the realm of traditional and cellular telephone communications due to 
technological innovations in other areas, such as enhanced data encryption); Geoffrey S. Corn, 
Averting the Inherent Dangers of “Going Dark”: Why Congress Must Require a Locked Front 
Door to Encrypted Data, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1433, 1433–44 (2015) (discussing the same). 
 11 See FINKLEA, supra note 6, at 8–9; James B. Comey, Dir., FBI, Remarks at Brookings 
Institution (Oct. 16, 2014), http://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/going-dark-are-technology-privacy-
and-public-safety-on-a-collision-course [https://perma.cc/7JTL-BJRK]. The Going Dark issue has 
become two-pronged, and currently pertains to both real-time communication, or “data in mo-
tion;” as well as stored data, or “data at rest.” See FINKLEA, supra note 6, at 9; Comey, supra 
(discussing the “two overlapping challenges” pertaining to the Going Dark issue). Each type of 
data is protected by a different form of an encryption: for example, data in motion tends to be 
protected by “end-to-end encryption,” whereas data at rest can be protected by the full-disk en-
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between government officials and technology executives regarding the 
proper balance between data security and effective law enforcement.12 
Moreover, recent court proceedings have drawn particular attention to the 
government’s practice of obtaining uncontested court orders requiring Ap-
ple to provide technical assistance in accessing locked devices, which it has 
relied upon for several years.13 In October 2015, in In re Order Requiring 
Apple, Inc. Assist in Execution of Search Warrant (“In re Apple, Inc.”), be-
fore U.S. Magistrate Judge James Orenstein in the U.S. District Court for 
the Eastern District of New York, Apple asserted its first challenge to such 
an order-application.14 Apple argued that it no longer conceded that the All 
Writs Act grants the authority to federal courts to order it to provide assis-
tance to the government.15 Judge Orenstein agreed, and entered a decision 
                                                                                                                           
cryption (“FDE”). Appuzo et al, supra note 1; David G. Ries & John W. Simek, Encryption Made 
Simple for Lawyers, GP SOLO, Nov.–Dec. 2012, at 18, 20. 
 12 E.g., FINKLEA, supra note 6, at 8–9; Corn, supra note 10, at 1433–34. 
 13 See Joe Palazzolo & Devlin Barrett, Roots of Apple-FBI Standoff Reach Back to 2008 Case, 
WALL STREET J. (Apr. 7, 2016, 2:00 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/roots-of-apple-fbi-standoff-
reach-back-to-2008-case-1460052008 [https://perma.cc/H4MQ-NY54]. 
 14 See Transcript of Argument Before the Honorable James Orenstein U.S. Magistrate Judge at 
55–56, In re Order Requiring Apple, Inc. Assist in Execution of Search Warrant, 149 F. Supp. 3d 341 
(E.D.N.Y. 2016) (No. 1:15-mc-01902) [hereinafter In re Apple, Inc., Transcript of Oct. 26, 2015]. 
Judge Orenstein is one of several magistrate judges that has been implicated in the “magistrates’ 
revolt,” which has been used to refer to a string of denials of questionable federal government sur-
veillance applications over the past decade. See Nicole Hong, Apple Encryption Fight Pushes Magis-
trate Judges into New Legal Frontier, WALL STREET J. (Mar. 1, 2016, 1:45 PM), http://www.wsj.
com/articles/apple-encryption-fight-pushes-magistrate-judges-into-new-legal-frontier-1456857948 
[https://perma.cc/Q64H-32VH]. 
 15 See In re Apple, Inc., Transcript of Oct. 26, 2015, supra note 14, at 61–62; see also 28 
U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2012) (the All Writs Act). Between October 2015 and February 2016, at least 
nine additional orders were issued by federal courts across the country directing Apple to assist 
the government in bypassing the passcodes of iPhones running on a variety of iOS versions, all 
pursuant to the All Writs Act. See In re Order Requiring Apple, Inc. Assist in Execution of Search 
Warrant (In re Apple, Inc.), 149 F. Supp. 3d 341, 349 (E.D.N.Y. 2016). Notably, one such order 
went as far as directing Apple to create and load Apple-signed software onto the phone of Syed 
Rizwan Farook, one of the San Bernardino gunmen, to disable the phone’s auto-erase function to 
enable the government to access the phone’s data with the help of forensic tools. See In re Apple 
iPhone Seized During the Execution of Search Warrant on Black Lexus IS300 (The San Bernardi-
no Shooter Case), No. ED 15-0451M, 2016 WL 618401, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2016); Devlin 
Barrett, San Bernardino iPhone Hack Doesn’t Work on Newer Models, FBI Says, WALL STREET 
J. (Apr. 7, 2016, 4:45 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/san-bernardino-iphone-hack-doesnt-
work-on-newer-models-fbi-director-says-1460050154 [https://perma.cc/X2PD-EXEQ]. Specifi-
cally, the court noted that “technical assistance” may include providing the FBI with a Software 
Image File (“SIF”), signed by Apple, that can be loaded onto the phone to modify the iPhone’s 
iOS using a mode traditionally used for device upgrades. See The San Bernardino Shooter Case, 
2016 WL 618401, at *1. Furthermore, the court directed that the SIF be coded with a unique iden-
tifier so that the SIF will only load and execute on the target phone. See id. The government later 
withdrew its claim after purchasing a forensic tool from a private third party that allowed it to 
unlock the phone without Apple’s assistance. See Barrett, supra note 15. James Comey later indi-
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holding the All Writs Act as unavailable as a matter of law to direct third-
party assistance in this context, which represents the first of its kind.16 Alt-
hough many believe that the issue will eventually be settled through legisla-
tion, the government’s interim efforts to get into several locked phones has 
drawn much attention to the propriety of the All Writs Act and the federal 
courts’ authority to command private assistance in order to effectuate a war-
rant.17 
This Note will discuss the federal courts’ authority to issue orders upon 
third parties to provide technical assistance to the government under the All 
Writs Act, and the related implications within the debate regarding cell-
phone encryption of data at rest.18 Part I discusses the encryption of data at 
rest on cellphones, particularly the type of encryption used on iPhones, and 
further discusses some of the constitutional and statutory implications that 
arise when law enforcement officials wish to search a cellphone.19 Part II 
discusses the All Writs Act particularly its application by the federal district 
courts to compel third-party assistance.20 Part III discusses In re Apple, Inc., 
in which Judge Orenstein denied the government’s application for an order 
compelling Apple to provide technical assistance under the All Writs Act.21 
Part IV argues that the All Writs Act does authorize the court to order com-
panies like Apple to provide technical assistance under certain circumstanc-
es, but that the ultimate solution to the encryption problem should come 
from Congress by expanding the Communication Assistance to Law En-
forcement Act (“CALEA”).22 
                                                                                                                           
cated that although the tool successfully opened the iPhone 5C at issue, it could not be used on 
newer iPhone models, such as the 5S or the 6. See id. 
 16 See In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d at 346–47, 349; In re Apple, Inc., Transcript of Oct. 
26, 2015, supra note 14, at 55, 62. 
 17 See Corn, supra note 10, at 1444–46 (discussing potential solutions to Going Dark); Devlin 
Barrett & Daisuke Wakabayashi, FBI Chief, Apple Lawyer Take Encryption Fight to Capitol Hill, 
WALL STREET J. (Mar. 1, 2016, 6:43 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/amid-encryption-fight-
attorney-general-urges-cooperation-1456830001?mod=trending_now_ [https://perma.cc/QU3M-
6MWX] (quoting executive branch officials’ congressional testimony regarding Going Dark and 
the government’s proceedings against Apple); Hong, supra note 14 (discussing ongoing proceed-
ings of March 2016). On February 29, 2016, a bill was introduced in the House of Representatives 
to establish a legislative advisory commission comprised of individuals from various fields to 
investigate the cellphone encryption issues and provide recommendations to Congress. See H.R. 
4651, 114th Cong. (2016). 
 18 See infra notes 23–222 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 30–86 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 92–142 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 149–170 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 181–222 and accompanying text. 
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I. ENCRYPTION, GOING DARK, AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY 
IMPLICATIONS OF SEARCHING A LOCKED SMARTPHONE 
Although government officials have decried the problem of “Going 
Dark” for well over a decade, up until recently, such concerns were not 
necessarily focused on digital data at rest, contained on cellphones, but ra-
ther digital data in motion.23 Accordingly, recent improvements in encryp-
tion protecting data at rest have brought a slew of new obstacles that law 
enforcement must now navigate throughout the course of otherwise routine 
investigations.24 This Part discusses cellphone data encryption and the in-
vestigative impediments that it creates for law enforcement officials.25 Sec-
tion A of this Part provides a brief overview of data encryption and its use 
in smartphones.26 Section B discusses the evolution of the data encryption 
on Apple’s iOS operating systems for iPhones and the current capabilities of 
the encryption technology on iOS 8 and higher.27 Section C provides a brief 
overview of the constitutional implications involved in governmental cell-
phone searches.28 Finally, Section D discusses the potentially relevant fed-
eral statutes implicated in searching an encrypted cellphone and more back-
ground on the Going Dark debate.29 
A. What Is Encryption? 
Encryption is the transformation of a plaintext message, by some pre-
designed protocol, into an enciphered form, known as “ciphertext,” in such 
a way that hides the substance of its content.30 Similarly, decryption is the 
inverse process of recapturing the content of that message.31 The “crypto-
                                                                                                                           
 23 See Corn, supra note 10, at 1433–45. 
 24 See id. at 1434–45. 
 25 See infra notes 30–86 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 30–36 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 37–53 and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra notes 54–65 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 66–86 and accompanying text. 
 30 See Benjamin Folkinshteyn, A Witness Against Himself: A Case for Stronger Legal Protec-
tion of Encryption, 30 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 375, 378 (2014); Jeffrey L. Vagle, Furtive 
Encryption: Power, Trust, and the Constitutional Cost of Collective Surveillance, 90 IND. L.J. 101, 
117 (2015). 
 31 CZESŁAW KOŚCIELNY ET AL., MODERN CRYPTOGRAPHY PRIMER 1 (2013). “Protocol” is 
an operation that transforms the message into an unintelligible string of ciphertext, generally by 
applying some form of mathematical function. See id. at 37; Vagle, supra note 30, at 117. Togeth-
er, the encryption and decryption algorithms form a “cipher,” or “cryptosystem,” with the goal of 
providing secret communication. See KOŚCIELNY ET AL., supra, at 3. 
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graphic key” is an additional input component known only to the designer 
and user, and its strength is crucial to a cipher’s effectiveness.32 
Today, encryption technology (“cryptography”) is widely used by gov-
ernments, businesses, and individuals throughout the world on a wide range 
of devices, increasingly including smartphones.33 In terms of reliable and 
practical cryptography, one of the earliest types of encryption software avail-
able for stored data on smartphones was full-disk encryption (“FDE”).34 FDE 
functions by converting everything on a phone’s hard drive, including the 
operating system, into unreadable ciphertext until the phone’s password is 
entered.35 Until recent years, few hardware-based FDE services were availa-
ble for smartphones, but they have now become more widespread.36 
B. An Apple Falls into the Darkness: Apple’s Encryption and Going Dark 
The encryption technology used on Apple’s iPhones has evolved from 
fairly rudimentary to highly sophisticated and secure due to the steady im-
plementation of increasingly better variations of FDE and remote wiping 
capabilities over the past decade.37 Until the release of iOS 8 in October 
                                                                                                                           
 32 KOŚCIELNY ET AL., supra note 31, at 3. A key usually takes the form of a number, but can 
be a representation of any value, and its strength is critical because most algorithms and protocols 
are publicly known and can be analyzed by experts. Id. 
 33 E.g., Vagle, supra note 30, at 120–22. Today, modern encryption is available for 
smartphones in a variety forms: software, hardware, and built-in encryption in operating systems. 
See id. at 119; Ries & Simek, supra note 11, at 20. Encryption designed to protect data on hard 
drives can be further grouped into two general categories: “file-level encryption” and “disk-level 
encryption.” Folkinshteyn, supra note 30, at 379; Ries & Simek, supra note 11, at 20. 
 34 See Radia, supra note 2. In comparison, “end-to-end encryption” protects data in transit 
between users, such as email and message services. See Jon Czas, Note: Business, Law, and Pro-
ject Prism, 12 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 897, 898 & n.11 (2014). Real-time interception of commu-
nications protected by end-to-end encryption, such as phone calls and emails, which is provided 
by telecommunications carriers and broadband providers, is governed at the federal level by the 
Communication Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (“CALEA”). See Comey, supra note 11; see 
also 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001–10 (2012) (CALEA). 
 35 E.g., KAREN SCARFONE ET AL., GUIDE TO STORAGE ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGIES FOR 
END USER DEVICES 3-1 (2007); Wilson, supra note 1, at 7–8. Full-disk encryption, or disk-level 
encryption, is distinguishable from file-level encryption in that it encrypts everything on a hard 
drive, rather than individual files. Folkinshteyn, supra note 30, at 379; Ries & Simek, supra note 
11, at 20. File-level encryption, often offered as smartphone applications, has at times been con-
sidered to offer less security, because any data outside one of those files is not protected. See Ra-
dia, supra note 2. 
 36 See Ries & Simek, supra note 11, at 21; Radia, supra note 2. On hardware-based systems, 
the cryptographic keys are stored on the hard drive instead of the computer’s memory, which 
makes key recovery more difficult and curbs the risk of malware and other threats. See SCARFONE 
ET AL., supra note 35, at 3-2 to -3. Additionally, hard-ware based systems can only be managed 
locally, whereas software-based FDE can be centrally managed on a remote server. See id. at 3-2. 
 37 See Jacqui Cheng, Can Apple Give Police a Key to Your Encrypted iPhone Data? Ars Investi-
gates, ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 4, 2012), http://arstechnica.com/apple/2012/04/can-apple-give-police-a-
key-to-your-encrypted-iphone-data-ars-investigates [https://perma.cc/SGU7-U7YZ]; Radia, supra 
1410 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 57:1403 
2014, Apple possessed the capabilities to bypass any iPhone’s lock screen 
passcode and turn over certain data—SMS iMessages, MMS, photos, vide-
os, contacts, call history, etc.—to authorities in response to a search war-
rant.38 Alternatively, authorities possessed the ability in many cases to guess 
a phone’s passcode using simple forensic tools.39 As part of the iOS 8 
rollout, Apple announced an update in its privacy policy, which claimed that 
under the new encryption system “it’s not technically feasible” for the com-
pany to cooperate with government warrants for the extraction of personal 
data.40 Like previous versions, iOS 8 is equipped with “Data Protection” 
software that encrypts individual applications/files using an encryption key, 
which is derived from an entanglement of the user-created password and an 
ID number, unique to each iPhone (“UID”).41 The encryption key is the 
product of running both the password and the UID through a key derivation 
function calibrated with an 80-millisecond iteration count, which makes 
each attempt at unlocking the device slower.42 Apple estimates that a brute-
force attack at trying all possible combinations of a six-character alphanu-
meric passcode may take up to 5½ years to complete, depending on the 
passcode’s strength.43 The principal difference between iOS 8 and previous 
versions is that under iOS 8, more data-sensitive applications receive that 
                                                                                                                           
note 2; David Schuetz, A (Not So) Quick Primer on iOS Encryption, DARTH-NULL.ORG (Oct. 6, 
2014), http://www.darthnull.org/2014/10/06/ios-encryption [https://perma.cc/86PA-6EKT]. 
 38 E.g., FINKLEA, supra note 6, at 6; Weinstein et al., supra note 7, at 744. 
 39 See DINO A. DAI ZOVI, TRAIL OF BITS, APPLE IOS 4 SECURITY EVALUATION 25, 29 
(2011). This technique of “guessing” all possible combinations is known as  a “brute-force” at-
tack, which normally involves a computer program that can attempt every possible combination of 
characters until it finds the correct one. See Peter Swire & Kenesa Ahmad, Encryption and Glob-
alization, 13 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 416, 430–32 (2012). 
 40 E.g., FINKLEA, supra note 6, at 5. 
 41 See APPLE, INC., IOS SECURITY-WHITEPAPER 9–11 (Oct. 2014); Matthew Green, Is Apple 
Picking a Fight with the U.S. Government?, SLATE (Sept. 23, 2014, 10:51 AM) [hereinafter Green, Is 
Apple Picking a Fight?], http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2014/09/ios_8_
encryption_why_apple_won_t_unlock_your_iphone_for_the_police.html [https://perma.cc/9Y9Z-
M8NW]. The UID is stored in the hardware and very difficult to extract. See Matthew Green, Why 
Can’t Apple Decrypt Your Phone?, CRYPTOGRAPHIC ENGINEERING BLOG (Oct. 4, 2014, 4:05 PM) 
[hereinafter Green, Why Can’t Apple Decrypt?], http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2014/
10/why-cant-apple-decrypt-your-iphone.html [https://perma.cc/D5GJ-J9TL]; see also APPLE, INC., 
supra note 41, at 11 (“The passcode is entangled with the device’s UID . . . .”). According to Apple’s 
October 2014 Security Guide: “No software or firmware can read them directly; they can only see the 
results of encryption or decryption operations performed using them. The UID is unique to each 
device and it’s not recorded by Apple or any of its suppliers.” APPLE, INC., supra note 41, at 9. 
 42 See APPLE, INC., supra note 41, at 11; Green, Is Apple Picking a Fight?, supra note 41. On 
certain devices with an A7 or later A-series processor, a 5-second delay between failed unlocking 
attempts is also enforced to further prevent brute-force attacks. See APPLE, INC., supra note 41, at 
11. 
 43 See APPLE, INC., supra note 41, at 11; Green, Is Apple Picking a Fight?, supra note 41. By 
comparison, a similar feature on iOS 4, still allowed a four-digit passcode to be guessed in under 
20 minutes. See DAI ZOVI, supra note 39, at 26–27, 29. 
2016] Compelling Access to Encrypted Data Under the All Writs Act 1411 
encryption by default, which Apple cannot extract by circumventing the 
passcode.44 
Further protection can be enabled by activating a feature from the set-
tings menu that will permanently wipe all of the data from a phone in the 
event a password is entered incorrectly ten consecutive times.45 The data 
encryption keys for recent iPhones—5S, 6, 6 Plus, 6S, or 6S Plus—are now 
stored in a hardware-based encryption co-processor, known as the “Secure 
Enclave.”46 Apple claims that it does not possess the capability to break into 
an iPhone’s Secure Enclave; but to do so, security experts have noted that a 
type of digital “skeleton key” would have to have been designed to which 
only the company has access, colloquially known as a “backdoor.”47 Back-
doors in any cryptosystem raise serious security concerns, because it is dif-
ficult to ensure that the intended access point will not be discovered and 
exploited by hackers or foreign intelligence agencies.48 
Google also initially reported in 2014 that the next version of its An-
droid operating system, “Android 5.0 Lollipop,” would support full-disk 
encryption by default.49 These moves from the two tech-giants reflect the 
                                                                                                                           
 44 See Green, Is Apple Picking a Fight?, supra note 41; APPLE, INC., supra note 41, at 10 
(“Key system apps, such as Messages, Mail, Calendar, Contacts, Photos, and Health data values 
use Data Protection by default, and third-party apps installed on iOS 7 or later receive this protec-
tion automatically.”); see also Green, Why Can’t Apple Decrypt, supra note 41 (“So to a large 
extent the ‘new’ feature Apple is touting in iOS 8 is simply that they’re encrypting more data.”). 
For example, photos and text messages were not previously encrypted under the passcode. See 
Green, Why Can’t Apple Decrypt, supra note 41. 
 45 See APPLE, INC., supra note 41, at 11. This function creates a significant protection against 
brute-force attacks, which have typically been used by law enforcement to unlock phones with the 
help of forensic tools. See Kerr, supra note 9. For example, the assistance sought from the FBI in 
the The San Bernardino Shooter Case, was an order that would direct Apple to develop a software 
update that could be uploaded to the targeted iPhone to disable this auto erase function. See The 
San Bernardino Shooter Case, 2016 WL 618401, at *1; Kerr, supra note 9. 
 46 See APPLE, INC., supra note 41, at 6–7, 9; Green, Is Apple Picking a Fight?, supra note 41. 
 47 See Green, Is Apple Picking a Fight?, supra note 41; see also Privacy—Government Infor-
mation Requests, APPLE INC. [hereinafter Apple Privacy—Gov’t Info. Req.], http://www.apple.
com/privacy/government-information-requests [https://perma.cc/MN5P-L5ZA] (“For all devices 
running iOS 8 and later versions, Apple will not perform iOS data extractions in response to gov-
ernment search warrants because the files to be extracted are protected by an encryption key that is 
tied to the user’s passcode, which Apple does not possess.”). As of March 7, 2016, Apple esti-
mates that 95% of its devices are running on iOS 8 or higher. See Support: App Store, APPLE DE-
VELOPER, https://developer.apple.com/support/app-store/ [https://perma.cc/N8FV-4L33]. 
 48 See FINKLEA, supra note 6, at 10; Swire & Ahmad, supra note 39, at 432–33, 436; Ellen 
Nakashima, Tech Giants Don’t Want Obama to Give Police Access to Encrypted Phone Data, 
WASH. POST (May 19, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/tech-giants-
urge-obama-to-resist-backdoors-into-encrypted-communications/2015/05/18/11781b4a-fd69-11e4-
833c-a2de05b6b2a4_story.html [https://perma.cc/832V-5VQP]. 
 49 See Weinstein et al., supra note 7, at 745; Andrew Cunningham, Google Quietly Backs 
Away from Encrypting New Lollipop Devices by Default [Updated], ARS TECHNICA (Mar. 2, 
2015, 12:00 PM), http://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2015/03/google-quietly-backs-away-from-encrypting-
new-lollipop-devices-by-default/ [https://perma.cc/H8BL-H3S7]. Although only a few devices 
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larger, and rather explosive trend among technology firms that have em-
braced tighter encryption in the wake of the Snowden revelations.50 Alt-
hough such efforts have been generally lauded by privacy advocates, many 
government officials have cautioned that such widespread encryption may 
make it impossible for police to execute search warrants on lawfully seized 
devices.51 Federal and state law enforcement officials have repeatedly em-
phasized the danger in expressly marketing products that enable terrorists 
and domestic criminals to place themselves beyond the reach of the law.52 
The debate over Going Dark, which continues to play out before the federal 
judiciary and congressional committees, presents unique and profoundly 
important questions regarding the appropriate balance between private and 
public security under the Fourth Amendment.53 
C. Federal Constitutional Implications Involved in Searching a Smartphone 
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees people the 
right to be free from certain kinds of governmental intrusion, namely unrea-
sonable searches and seizures.54 In the context of a search, this protection 
                                                                                                                           
running Lollipop have actually encrypted by default, Google has indicated that FDE will be a 
requirement in future Android versions, and that performance issues have hindered its implemen-
tation thus far. See Cunningham, supra. 
 50 See, Joris V.J. van Hoboken & Ira S. Rubinstein, Privacy and Security in the Cloud: Some 
Realism About Technical Solutions to Transnational Surveillance in the Post-Snowden Era, 66 
ME. L. REV. 487, 508–10 (2014) (discussing the reactions and industrial solutions to consumer 
distrust in the wake of the Snowden revelations, specifically in the context of Cloud computing 
and flows between data centers); Menn et al., supra note 4 (discussing heavily secured 
smartphones and the market trends among technology firms, such as Google, Apple, and Face-
book Inc., who have been incorporating bolstered encryption technologies into their products and 
services). The Snowden revelations refer to a number of released documents, beginning in June 
2013, by Edward Snowden, former U.S. National Security Agency (“NSA”) contractor, which 
revealed that the NSA had been collecting mass quantities of customer records from cloud compu-
ting platforms, U.S. wireless carriers, and several internet service providers under the authority of 
Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act and Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act. See Weinstein 
et al., supra note 7, at 729–30.  
 51 See Weinstein et al., supra note 7, at 745–46; Green, Is Apple Picking a Fight?, supra note 
41. Those fears have begun to manifest, and tensions have escalated as law enforcement officials 
continuously encounter investigative obstacles due to heavily encrypted iPhones. See Barrett & 
Wakabayashi, supra note 17. 
 52 See Weinstein et al, supra note 7, at 745; Barrett & Wakabayashi, supra note 17; Comey, 
supra note 11. 
 53 See In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d at 347–48; Corn, supra note 10, at 1436–37; Barrett 
& Wakabayashi, supra note 17. 
 54 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no war-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . .”); see United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949–
50 (2012); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350–52 (1967) (holding that the Fourth Amend-
ment “protects people, not places” from certain kinds of governmental intrusion, thus departing 
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only applies, however, where the target of government action has manifest-
ed an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the item or infor-
mation subject to the search.55 Once the protection is implicated, a particu-
larized warrant based on probable cause is generally required before law 
enforcement officials may execute a search, unless one of several excep-
tions applies.56 Where a validly substantiated warrant is obtained from a 
neutral and detached magistrate, there is a strong presumption that the sub-
sequent search will be reasonable under the Constitution.57 
In 2014, in Riley v. California, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the 
Fourth Amendment generally requires a warrant to search the digital data 
contained on a cellphone.58 Even before Riley, however, many law en-
                                                                                                                           
from the previous doctrine that the Fourth Amendment had its principle moorings in trespass 
laws). 
 55 See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39–40 (1988); Katz, 389 U.S. at 351–53; Wil-
son, supra note 1, at 9–10 (noting that this inquiry requires both a subjective manifestation of that 
expectation and an objective analysis as to whether that expectation is one that society would 
recognize as reasonable). For example, it has long been held that there is no reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in information disclosed to third parties, whether they be individual or institutional. 
See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 303 
(1966). 
 56 See Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459 (2011); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 
443, 454–55 (1971); see also Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (“[B]ecause the 
ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness,’ the warrant requirement is 
subject to certain exceptions.”); Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557 (2004) (holding that a valid 
warrant must provide particularity in both the place being searched and the object sought); John 
M.A. DiPippa, Is the Fourth Amendment Obsolete? Restating the Fourth Amendment in Function-
al Terms, 22 GONZ. L. REV. 483, 486 n.20 (1986/1987) (“There are at least seven [recognized] 
exceptions to the warrant requirement.”); William Clark, Note, Protecting the Privacies of Digital 
Life: Riley v. California, the Fourth Amendment’s Particularity Requirement, and Search Proto-
cols for Cellphone Search Warrants, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1981, 1986–87 (2015) (discussing the par-
ticularity element of the warrant requirement, which is satisfied by articulable descriptions of “the 
place to be searched” and “the people or things to be seized” (quoting the Fourth Amendment)). 
 57 See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913–14 (1984) (holding that “great deference” 
should be given to a magistrate’s issuance of a warrant, but that deference does not preclude fur-
ther inquiry into the circumstances surrounding its application and issuance); see also Riley v. 
California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014) (“[T]he ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 
‘reasonableness.’ . . . In the absence of a warrant, a search is reasonable only if it falls within a 
specific exception to the warrant requirement.” (quoting Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403)); United 
States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106 (1965) (“[I]n a doubtful or marginal case a search under a 
warrant may be sustainable where without one it would fail.”); United States v. Lemke, No. 08–
216(1), 2008 WL 4999246, at *14 (D. Minn. Nov. 19, 2008) (“[T]he reviewing Court must not 
engage in a de novo review but, rather, should accord great deference to the decision of the Judi-
cial Officer who issued the Warrant.”). 
 58 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2493 Although the actual question presented in Riley v. California was 
whether the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement justified the warrantless 
search of a cellphone, the unanimous opinion of the court has been widely interpreted as establish-
ing a bright-line rule that a warrant is required before a cellphone may be searched. See id. at 
2495; Clark, supra note 56, at 1996. The Court also noted that the exigent-circumstances excep-
tion would most likely still apply to cellphones, which may justify warrantless searches under 
certain circumstances. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494. 
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forcement officials regularly sought and obtained search warrants before 
searching seized cellphones.59 Many have opined that recent and continuing 
advancements in device-encryption could pose a danger to public safety and 
threaten the time-honored functionality of the warrant requirement, if poten-
tially probative evidence can no longer be lawfully obtained without the 
phone’s password.60 Some argue that an impenetrable barrier to lawful war-
rant executions is fundamentally inconsistent with the fulcrum of the Fourth 
Amendment.61 These concerns fit neatly under the already existent problem 
of Going Dark, which signifies law enforcement’s inability to access certain 
data and communications—in this case, for example, contents of encrypted 
electronic devices.62 Some have deflected such criticism by suggesting there 
are methods available to authorities that would allow them to get into seized 
devices, such as obtaining the passcode from the phone’s owner or utilizing 
cryptanalytic techniques.63 The former solution may be a nullity, however, 
as the only federal appeals court to have ruled on the matter held that com-
pelling the owner of an electronic device to divulge his or her password is 
precluded by the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause.64 Further-
more, the viability of existing forensic techniques, such as brute-force, is 
                                                                                                                           
 59 See In re Search of White Apple iPhone, Model A1332, No. C–12–224M, 2012 WL 
2945996, at *1–2, (S.D. Tex. Apr. 11, 2012) (denying government’s application for a warrant to 
search defendant’s iPhone, which had been taken into custody as a result of his arrest); Lemke, 
2008 WL 4999246, at *7 (discussing the circumstances surrounding the search of a cellphone 
seized incident to an arrest, which included securing the cellphone in the arresting officer’s desk 
until a warrant was obtained). 
 60 See Corn, supra note 10, at 1439, 1455–56; Comey, supra note 11; Orin Kerr, Apple’s 
Dangerous Game, WASH. POST (Sept. 19, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2014/09/19/apples-dangerous-game [https://perma.cc/8VTN-UJFH]; Cyrus R. Vance 
Jr., Opinion, Apple and Google Threaten Public Safety with Default Smartphone Encryption, 
WASH. POST (Sept. 26, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/apple-and-google-threaten-
public-safety-with-default-smartphone-encryption/2014/09/25/43af9bf0-44ab-11e4-b437-1a73682
04804_story.html [https://perma.cc/C2GC-NPCU]. 
 61 Corn, supra note 10, at 1439 (“[T]he people have never had an absolute and unqualified right 
to privacy but instead a right to be secure against unreasonable government intrusions . . . .”). 
 62 See FINKLEA, supra note 6, at 8–9; Comey, supra note 11; see supra note 11 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the Going Dark challenges that face law enforcement with increasingly 
robust encryption of data at rest). 
 63 See FINKLEA, supra note 6, at 8, 11. 
 64 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Mar. 25, 2011, 670 F.3d 1335, 1346–
49 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding that forced decryption of a computer hard drive was precluded by the 
Self-Incrimination Clause, because production of a computer’s password is testimonial communi-
cation); Dan Terzian, Forced Decryption as Equilibrium—Why It’s Constitutional and How Riley 
Matters, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 1131, 1133 (2015); see also U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person . . . 
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .”); Wilson, supra note 
1, at 27 (discussing the precarious state of the law with regards to compelled decryption). See 
generally J. Riley Atwood, The Encryption Problem: Why the Courts and Technology Are Creat-
ing a Mess for Law Enforcement, 34 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 407, 416–24 (2015) (discussing 
the development and current state of how federal courts approach compelled decryption). 
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difficult to fully ascertain because such techniques tend to be very device 
specific due to variable features, such as the auto-erase function.65 
D. Apples and Oranges: Relevant, but Inapposite Federal Statutes 
Currently, there is no federal statute that explicitly covers the propriety 
of compelling third-party manufacturers to bypass the passcodes of locked 
mobile devices to provide access for the government.66 Nevertheless, there 
are two federal laws that arguably come close.67 The first is the Stored 
Communications Act (“SCA”), which was enacted under Title II of the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”) in 1986.68 Among other 
things, the SCA governs when government actors may compel network ser-
vice providers to disclose stored electronic communications.69 This most 
likely does not apply to governmental requests for assistance in bypassing 
the lock-screen of devices, however, because the password itself is not an 
“electronic communication” held by the third-party service provider.70 
                                                                                                                           
 65 See FINKLEA, supra note 6, at 8; The Govt’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Appli-
cation for an Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Law Enforcement Agents in Execution of a 
Search Warrant at 40–44, In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d 341 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (No. 1:15-mc-
01902) [hereinafter Govt’s District Court Brief]. At least one undisclosed technique developed by 
a third party and provided to the government in The San Bernardino Case, has proven to be effec-
tive in accessing an iPhone 5C running iOS9, but its applicability to other situations is currently 
unknown. See Barrett, supra note 15; Palazzolo & Barrett, supra note 13. For example, the gov-
ernment claims that it cannot be used to access newer models of iPhones, such as the 5S or the 6. 
See Barrett, supra note 15. 
 66 See In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d at 355, 363; Wilson, supra note 1, at 31–32; Chris-
tian Levis, Note, Smartphone, Dumb Regulations: Mixed Signals in Mobile Privacy, 22 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 191, 204 (2011). 
 67 See In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d at 356–58; Wilson, supra note 1, at 30–32. Further-
more, there are other provisions in the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”) and the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) that require private firms to furnish technical as-
sistance with court ordered interceptions, installation of pen registers, and acquisition of commu-
nication. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(4), 3124(a) (2012); 50 U.S.C. § 1881(a)(h)(1)(A) (2012); van 
Hoboken & Rubinstein, supra note 50, at 525. All three provisions contain similar language, in 
that they require firms to provide “all information, facilities, and technical assistance necessary to 
accomplish the interception unobtrusively and with a minimum of interference.” van Hoboken & 
Rubinstein, supra note 50, at 525. 
 68 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2012); Wilson, supra note 1, at 30–32. See generally Melissa 
Medina, The Stored Communications Act: An Old Statute for Modern Times, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 
267 (2013), for a more comprehensive account of the SCA’s structure, applicability, and modern 
interpretation. 
 69 E.g., Melinda L. McLellan et al., Wherever You Go, There You Are (With Your Mobile 
Device): Privacy Risks and Legal Complexities Associated with International “Bring Your Own 
Device” Programs, 21 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 1, 24 (2014). The Stored Communications Act 
(“SCA”) applies to both “electronic communication service” (“ECS”) providers, which includes 
telephone companies, and “remote computing service providers,” which includes companies like 
YouTube. E.g., Wilson, supra note 1, at 30–31. 
 70 See Wilson, supra note 1, at 31–32; Reid Day, Comment, Let the Magistrates Revolt: A 
Review of Search Warrant Applications for Electronic Information Possessed by Online Services, 
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Second, there is the CALEA, enacted in 1994, which mandates that tele-
communications carriers, broadband, and Voice over Internet Protocol pro-
viders design their equipment, facilities, and services to ensure that their net-
works are technologically amenable to government wiretap orders.71 This 
generally requires carriers to maintain built-in surveillance capabilities in 
their networks to allow the government to monitor and access communica-
tions in real-time.72 Specifically, a carrier must be able to isolate and intercept 
wire and electronic communications transmitted within its network, and it 
must possess the capability to either deliver those communications to law 
enforcement personnel or enable the government access on its own.73 It fur-
ther requires carriers to facilitate authorized access to call-identifying infor-
mation that is reasonably available to the carrier.74 Furthermore, it mandates 
carriers to consult with transmission equipment manufacturers and support 
services as necessary to ensure compliance, and requires those manufacturers 
and support services to cooperate.75 Lastly, CALEA only requires built-in 
                                                                                                                           
64 U. KAN. L. REV. 491, 502 (2015); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2012) (“‘[E]lectronic com-
munication’ means any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of 
any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or 
potooptical system that affects interstate or foreign commerce . . . .”). If it were, the password 
would be obtainable with a Rule 41 warrant. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a); Wilson, supra note 1, at 
31–32. Interpretation of the SCA in the context of emerging technologies has been met with many 
challenges. See McLellan et al., supra note 69, at 24. 
 71 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001–10; see In re Order Requiring Apple, Inc. Assist in Execution of Search 
Warrant (In re Apple—Preliminary Mem. and Order), No. 1:15-mc-01902, 2015 WL 5920207, at 
*2–3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2015) (preliminary memorandum and order); van Hoboken & Rubinstein, 
supra note 50, at 526. The text of CALEA refers only to telecommunications carriers, which the 
Act defines as an “entity engaged in the transmission or switching of wire or electronic communi-
cations as a common carrier for hire,” but also directs carriers to consult with equipment manufac-
turers and support services. 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001(8)(A), 1002(a), 1005(a); see Am. Council on Educ. 
v. FCC, 451 F.3d 226, 228 (D.C. Cir. 2006). CALEA also contains a provision, known colloquial-
ly as the “substantial replacement provision,” which allows the FCC to expand the definition of 
“telecommunications carrier” to include emerging technologies that it finds substantially replace 
the functions of “the local telephone exchange service.” See 47 U.S.C. § 1001(8)(B)(ii); see also 
Am. Council on Educ., 451 F.3d at 229 (discussing the FCC’s administrative expansion of 
CALEA to cover Voice-over-Internet Protocol technologies and broadband networks). 
 72 E.g., Stephanie K. Pell, Jonesing for a Privacy Mandate, Getting a Technology Fix—
Doctrine to Follow, 14 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 489, 536 (2013). CALEA tapers this mandate by limit-
ing technological capability requirements to that which provides a “minimum of interference” 
with customer services and in a manner that respects the privacy of communications and infor-
mation not authorized for interception. See 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(4)(A); van Hoboken & Rubin-
stein, supra note 50, at 526. 
 73 See 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a); Van Hoboken & Rubinstein, supra note 50, at 526. 
 74 See 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2); see also id. § 1001(2) (“‘[C]all-identifying information’ means 
dialing or signaling information that identifies the origin, direction, destination, or termination of 
each of each communication generated or received by a subscriber by means of any equipment, 
facility, or service of a telecommunications carrier.”). 
 75 See 47 U.S.C. § 1005. 
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capabilities for access, it is not a blanket authorization for governmental ac-
cess, which must be predicated by some independent court order.76 
One notable statutory limitation is that CALEA explicitly excludes from 
coverage “persons or entities insofar as they are engaged in providing infor-
mation services,” which includes internet service providers, email services, 
and electronic publishing services.77 Secondly, carriers are not responsible for 
decrypting any encrypted communication unless the cryptosystem was pro-
vided by the carrier and the carrier possesses the information necessary to 
decrypt the communication.78 Therefore, CALEA does not apply to password 
encrypted devices and the underlying data at rest, because it is explicitly lim-
ited to the interception of real-time communications and call-identifying in-
formation transmitted by telecommunications carriers.79 
The possibility of updating and expanding CALEA to cover companies 
like Apple and Google has been discussed by law enforcement and mem-
bers of Congress since as early as 2009, but no proposed amendments to 
CALEA have ever been introduced by Congress.80 Although CALEA only 
                                                                                                                           
 76 See id. §§ 1001(8)(C)(i); 1002(a); Am. Council on Educ., 451 F.3d at 228 n.2. CALEA does 
not affect the scope of the government’s powers to conduct wiretapping and surveillance, which is 
principally prescribed under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (“the 
Wiretap Act”) and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”). See Am. Council on Educ., 
451 F.3d at 228 n.2; Christa M. Hibbard, Note, Wiretapping the Internet: The Expansion of the 
Communications Assistance to Law Enforcement Act to Extend Government Surveillance, 64 FED. 
COMM. L.J. 371, 374–75 (2012). CALEA instead applies to technologies used by the carriers in 
their networks, and even requires companies to allow the FBI to review compliance modifications 
prior to their implementation. See Pell, supra note 72, at 536. 
 77 47 U.S.C. § 1002(b)(2)(A); see Am. Council on Educ., 451 F.3d at 228; van Hoboken & 
Rubinstein, supra note 50, at 526; see also 47 U.S.C. § 1001(6)(A) (“‘[I]nformation services’ . . . 
means the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, 
retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via telecommunications . . . [including] . . . 
electronic messaging services . . . .”). The FCC, which is charged with administering CALEA, has 
determined that “information services” under CALEA should be interpreted narrowly. See In the 
Matter of Commc’ns Assistance for Law Enf’t Act & Broadband Access & Servs., 20 FCC Rcd. 
14989, 15000 (2005). Thus, when a single entity provides multiple types of services, CALEA 
applies to any telecommunications component of that entity’s services, whereas it does not apply 
to any information-service component of those services. See id. 
 78 See 47 U.S.C. § 1002(b)(3); van Hoboken & Rubinstein, supra note 50, at 526. A third 
statutory limitation, is that CALEA does not authorize a government agency to require electronic 
communication services, manufacturers of telecommunications equipment, or telecommunications 
support services to adopt “any specific design of equipment, facilities, services, features, or sys-
tem configurations,” or prohibit the adoption thereof. 47 U.S.C. § 1002(b)(1). 
 79 See 47 U.S.C. § 1002; In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d at 355–57; Peter T. King, Remem-
bering the Lessons of 9/11: Preserving Tools and Authorities in the Fight Against Terrorism, 41 J. 
LEGIS. 173, 178 (2014). 
 80 See King, supra note 79, at 178–79. A proposal to expand CALEA to cover all communica-
tions service providers—including e-mail service providers, social networking sites, and peer-to-peer 
messaging services was drafted by the FBI and approved by the DOJ in or around 2009. Id. at 179. 
The proposal was never sent to Congress. Id. Discussions as late as 2012 had primarily been focused 
on encryption’s debilitating effect on the government’s ability to conduct wiretaps for e-mail ser-
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pertains to wiretapping, the story behind its adoption and effect is analogous 
to the current challenges presented by enhanced encryption of data at rest.81 
Many federal officials seem to be in agreement that a legislative solution of 
some kind will eventually be needed.82 Cryptographers and security experts 
have consistently cautioned against any legislatively mandated “back door” 
because it would materially weaken security.83 The Obama administration 
indicated in October 2015 that it would not pursue legislation just yet, but 
would instead continue conversations with the tech industry, which have 
since remained ongoing amidst several congressional hearings.84 In the in-
terim, there are still phones that the government has seized that it cannot 
access, and federal prosecutors have largely turned to the judiciary for more 
immediate relief.85 As early as 2008, prosecutors have sought and obtained 
                                                                                                                           
vices, social-networking sites, and peer-to-peer communication providers. See Devlin McCullagh, 
FBI: We Need Wiretap-Ready Websites—Now, CNET (May 4, 2012, 9:24 AM), http://www.cnet.
com/news/fbi-we-need-wiretap-ready-web-sites-now [https://perma.cc/L3CU-QRX4]; see also Go-
ing Dark: Lawful Electronic Surveillance in the Face of New Technologies: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th 
Cong. 14–15, 42–43 (2011) [hereinafter Going Dark Part I] (statement and testimony of Valerie 
Caproni, General Counsel, FBI) (discussing the problem facing law enforcement as being an inability 
to intercept certain communications in response to a court order, rather than directly suggesting 
CALEA should be expanded). There have been thoughts that an expansion of CALEA could address 
this issue; and proposals to expand its scope to cover all communication services, including internet 
and email, have been discussed. See Going Dark Part I, supra, at 42; van Hoboken & Rubinstein, 
supra note 50, at 502 & n.92. 
 81 See Comey, supra note 11; Going Dark: Encryption, Technology, and the Balance Between 
Public Safety and Privacy: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 3–8. 
(2015) [hereinafter Going Dark Part II—Yates & Comey Statement] (statement of Sally Quillian 
Yates, Deputy Attorney General, DOJ & James Comey, Director, FBI). 
 82 See Barrett & Wakabayashi, supra note 17 (discussing the hearing before the House Judici-
ary Committee in 2016, where both state and federal officials testified about potential solutions). 
See generally van Hoboken & Rubinstein, supra note 50, at 514–33 (discussing front door and 
back door access points, and the relationship between CALEA and cloud-computing). 
 83 See, e.g., Andy Greenberg, Why Proposed State Bans on Phone Encryption Are Moronic, 
SLATE (Jan. 29, 2016, 12:14 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2016/01/29/new_york_
and_california_have_proposed_state_bans_on_phone_encryption.html [https://perma.cc/9VTE-S8GK]. 
 84 See The Encryption Tightrope: Balancing Americans’ Security and Privacy: Hearing Be-
fore the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2016) [hereinafter Encryption Tightrope Hear-
ing] (statement of Rep. Goodlatte, Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary); World Wide Threats: 
Hearing Before the H. Permanent Select Comm. On Intelligence, 114th Cong. (2016) (testimony 
of James Comey, Director, FBI); Barrett & Wakabayashi, supra note 17; Zakrzewski, supra note 
5. On the state level, both California and New York have introduced bills that would ban the retail 
sale of smartphones incapable of being decrypted and unlocked by its manufacturer or operating 
system provider. See A.B. 1681, 2016 Cal. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016); A.B. 8093, 2015 
N.Y. Assemb., 238th Sess. (N.Y. 2015). Both bills have been viewed as an effort to entice the 
federal government to take steps to address the issue. See Greenberg, supra note 83. 
 85 See Barrett & Wakabayashi, supra note 17 (noting that federal prosecutors are pursuing 
orders against Apple in various proceedings involving at least fifteen seized iPhones in unrelated 
criminal matters). 
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orders to direct Apple, and other unknown vendors, to provide technical 
assistance in gaining access to encrypted devices in over seventy cases.86 
II. THE ALL WRITS ACT 
In those seventy-plus cases, the government has filed its order-applica-
tions under a statute known as the All Writs Act, which has occasionally been 
used to order third-party assistance to the government in other similar con-
texts since the 1970s.87 This Part discusses the legal authority behind the gov-
ernment’s efforts to conscript third-party decryption assistance in order to 
execute device search warrants.88 Section A of this Part provides a brief his-
torical overview of the All Writs Act and background discussion of the Act as 
a source of injunctive relief.89 Section B discusses specific requirements that 
must be satisfied by a party seeking an All Writs injunction in the federal dis-
trict courts.90 Section C discusses the federal courts’ authority under the Act 
to compel third-party assistance to the government.91 
A. Historical & Procedural Overview of the All Writs Act 
The All Writs Act, codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), provides in its en-
tirety: “The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress 
may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective juris-
dictions and agreeable to the usage and principles of law.”92 The Act traces 
its lineage, in substance, back to two sections of the Judiciary Act of 1789.93 
                                                                                                                           
 86 See In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d at 348; Palazzolo & Barrett, supra note 13. 
 87 See In re Order Requiring Apple, Inc. Assist in Execution of Search Warrant (In re Apple, 
Inc.), 149 F. Supp. 3d 341, 348 (E.D.N.Y. 2016); Palazzolo & Barrett, supra note 13; see also 
United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 172 174–78 (1977) (holding that a district court has 
authority under the Act to order public telephone companies to provide technical assistance to the 
FBI in order to execute a surveillance order). 
 88 See infra notes 92–142 and accompanying text. 
 89 See infra notes 92–108 and accompanying text. 
 90 See infra notes 109–131 and accompanying text. 
 91 See infra notes 132–142 and accompanying text. 
 92 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2012). A “writ” is a court’s written order commanding the addressee 
to do or refrain from doing some specified act in the name of a state or other competent legal au-
thority. Writ, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 93 See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 13–14, 1 Stat. 73, 81–82 (1789); N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 
U.S. at 172; Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, Removal Jurisdiction and the All Writs Act, 148 U. PA. L. 
REV. 401, 433 (1999). Sections 13 and 14 of the First Judiciary Act provided the ancestral influ-
ence for § 1651(a). See Sheinkopf Hoffman, supra note 93, at 401 n.4. In 1948, the two provisions 
were essentially consolidated into what is now referred to as the All Writs Act, promulgated in its 
current form in 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), which substantially mirrors the language of section 14. 28 
U.S.C. § 1651(a); see Michael D. Sousa, A Casus Omissus in Preventing Bankruptcy Fraud: Or-
dering a Search of a Debtor’s Home, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 93, 111–12, 111 n.114 (2012); see also Pa. 
Bureau of Corr. v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 474 U.S. 34, 40–42 (1985) (discussing the legislative 
history of 28 U.S.C. § 1651 as being a consolidation of section 14 and various provisions without 
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The fundamental purpose of the All Writs Act has been to supply the federal 
courts with the procedural tools necessary to perform their duty and protect 
their respective jurisdictions.94 
As interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court, the All Writs Act empowers a 
federal court to issue any writ that may be “necessary or appropriate” to help 
effectuate a previously issued order.95 For example, if parties of an action 
were free to ignore a court judgment or order, the issuing court’s ability to 
perform its duties would be undermined.96 Thus, if a litigant’s conduct can be 
properly characterized as violating a previously issued court order, the issuing 
court has jurisdiction to enjoin that conduct.97 Furthermore, this power may 
also extend to persons or entities who, though not parties to the original ac-
tion or engaged in any wrongdoing, are in a position to frustrate the imple-
mentation of a court order or to thwart the administration of justice.98 
                                                                                                                           
substantial change in meaning or purpose). As a result of the 1948 revisions, the All Writs Act is 
the sole statutory authority on which a court may base its issuance of an extraordinary writ, with 
the exception of 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) concerning writs of habeas corpus. See Sheinkopf Hoffman, 
supra, at 434–35. 
 94 Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 300 (1969) (“This statute has served since its inclusion, in 
substance, in the original Judiciary Act as a ‘legislatively approved source of procedural instru-
ments designed to achieve ‘the rational ends of law.’” (quoting Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 
282 (1948))); see Sousa, supra note 93, at 112–13; see also Wythe Holt “To Establish Justice”: 
Politics, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the Invention of the Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1421, 
1507 (describing section 14, known as the “all-writs” provision, as “the most expansive and open-
ended” provision in the First Judiciary Act, and discussing its versatility in application). Thus, some 
courts have characterized the All Writs Act as a partial codification of long-recognized equitable 
principles, which have allowed federal courts to effectuate their own previous decrees or judg-
ments by injunctions or writs of assistance. See Wesch v. Folsom, 6 F.3d 1465, 1470 (11th Cir. 
1993); Hamilton v. Nakai, 453 F.2d 152, 157 (9th Cir. 1971). Those instruments include the 
common-law writs of certiorari, injunction, prohibition, mandamus, and all other writs available at 
common law. See 3-27 MOORE’S MANUAL: FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 27.07 (Mat-
thew Bender) [hereinafter 3-27 MOORE’S MANUAL]. 
 95 N.Y. Tele. Co., 434 U.S. at 172; see also id. at 172–73 (“[U]nless appropriately confined by 
Congress, a federal court may avail itself of all auxiliary writs as aids in the performance of its 
duties, when the use of such historic aids is calculated in its sound judgment to achieve the ends of 
justice entrusted to it.” (quoting Adams v. U.S. ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 273 (1942))). In 
terms of form, only injunctive orders under the Act will be discussed in this Note, because the use 
of other common-law writs in federal district courts has been curtailed by the Federal Rules. See 
3-27 MOORE’S MANUAL, supra note 94, § 27.07; see also FED. R. APP. P. 21 (providing procedur-
al guidelines regarding writs of mandamus and prohibition); FED R. CIV. P. 81(b) (abolishing the 
writ of mandamus and scire facias at the federal district court level). 
 96 E.g. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 188 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). 
 97 See id.; Harris, 394 U.S. at 299 (citation omitted) (“[The All Writs Act] has served . . . as a 
‘legislatively approved source of procedural instruments to achieve ‘the rational ends of law.’” 
(quoting Price, 334 U.S. at 282)); Marshall v. Local Union No. 639, 593 F.2d 1297, 1302 (D.C. 
Cir. 1979). 
 98 N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 174. This prescribed reach to nonparties “encompasses even 
those who have not taken any affirmative action to hinder justice.” Id.; see also United States v. 
Doe, 537 F. Supp. 838, 839 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (using power under the All Writs Act to order a 
telephone company to supply telephone toll records); In re Order Requiring XXX, Inc. to Assist in 
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In the district courts, orders under the All Writs Act typically take the 
form of an injunction, and may only be issued when necessary to protect the 
court’s underlying subject matter jurisdiction.99 Thus, as courts with limited 
original jurisdiction, federal district courts can only issue orders under the 
Act in aid of that jurisdiction acquired on some independent ground.100 Pro-
cedurally, the Act enables district courts to issue injunctions under two dis-
tinct circumstances: (1) to safeguard ongoing proceedings; and (2) to effec-
tuate already-issued orders and judgments.101 In either situation a district 
court’s jurisdiction has already been established; thus, when some conduct 
threatens to undermine the court’s abilities to perform its duties it may issue 
an “ancillary injunction” under the Act to enjoin that conduct and preserve 
its jurisdiction.102 
The All Writs injunction is slightly distinct from alternative forms of 
injunctive relief, such as traditional injunctions and statutory injunctions.103 
                                                                                                                           
Execution of Search Warrant by Unlocking Cellphone (In re XXX, Inc.), No. 14 Mag. 2258, 2014 
WL 5510865, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2014) (issuing an order under the All Writs Act directing a 
cellphone manufacturer to assist in the execution of a search warrant by “bypassing the lock 
screen” of subject’s cellphone). 
 99 See Klay v. United Healthgroup, Inc., 376 F.3d 1092, 1099–1100 (11th Cir. 2004); 1-10A 
MOORE’S MANUAL: FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 10A.05 [hereinafter 1-10A MOORE’S 
MANUAL] (discussing ancillary injunctions under the All Writs Act, which are used to prevent 
conduct that could frustrate the court’s jurisdiction). 
 100 See Clinton v. Goldsmith, 526 U.S. 529, 534–35 (1999); ITT Cmty. Dev. Corp. v. Barton, 
569 F.2d 1351, 1358–59 (5th Cir. 1978); Dimitri D. Portnoi, Note, Resorting to Extraordinary 
Writs: How the All Writs Act Rises to Fill the Gaps in the Rights of Enemy Combatants, 83 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 293, 301 (2008). Federal district courts have original federal question jurisdiction, diversi-
ty jurisdiction, and special statutory and supplemental jurisdiction under certain circumstances. 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1331–1332, 1367(a) (2012); see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1337–1338, 1340 (2012) (providing 
district courts with original jurisdiction). 
 101 See Klay, 376 F.3d at 1099; Barton, 569 F.2d at 1359–60 (noting that the All Writs Act 
permits a district court to issue any order “necessary to enable the court to try the issue [in a pend-
ing case] to final judgment” and “develop the material issues and to bring them to a complete 
resolution”); Fruquan Mouzon, Forgive Us Our Trespasses: The Need for Federal Expungement 
Legislation, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 1, 17 (2008); see also N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 172 (noting the 
long-recognized authority of the federal courts to issue orders under the All Writs Act to “effectu-
ate and prevent the frustration of orders it has previously issued in its exercise of jurisdiction oth-
erwise obtained”). 
 102 See Klay, 376 F.3d at 1099, 1102; Phillips Beverage Co. v. Belvedere S.A., 204 F.3d 805, 
806 (8th Cir. 2000); see also 1-10A MOORE’S MANUAL, supra note 99, § 10A.05 (defining “ancil-
lary injunction” as an injunction “used by a federal court to sustain its jurisdiction”). The converse 
is also true, if lack of conduct would tend to undermine a court’s ability to perform its duties, such 
as ignoring an order or judgment, the court may issue an injunction requiring the party to comply 
or carry out the terms of the judgment. See N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 187 (Stevens, J., dissenting 
in part); see also In re Y & A Grp. Sec. Litig., 38 F.3d 380, 382 (8th Cir. 1994) (“All Writs Act 
indirectly confers on injunction beneficiaries the right to judicial enforcement.”). 
 103 See Klay, 376 F.3d at 1100–02; Portnoi, supra note 100, at 299–301. There are at least 
three different types of injunctions a federal court can issue: a “traditional injunction,” a statutory 
injunction, or an injunction under the All Writs Act. Klay, 376 F.3d at 1097–99; see Portnoi, supra 
note 100, at 300. A traditional injunction can be issued as either interim or permanent relief predi-
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First, a traditional injunction is predicated upon some cause of action, 
whereas an All Writs injunction is predicated upon some identifiable threat 
to the integrity of an ongoing proceeding, or previously issued order or 
judgment.104 Secondly, the primary purpose of an All Writs injunction is to 
protect the integrity of the court and its jurisdiction, rather than to protect 
the rights of individuals.105 That is not to say, however, that a district court 
may evade the more stringent requirements of other applicable forms of 
injunctive relief by purporting to issue an All Writs injunction.106 The Act is 
firmly regarded as a remedy of last resort.107 No one clear test or standard 
for the All Writs Act has been consistently articulated, but the general pur-
pose and fundamental limitations underlying the Act have received relative-
ly consistent, piecemeal application.108  
                                                                                                                           
cated upon a cause of action, whether it be an alleged breach of common law, statutory, or consti-
tutional rights. See Klay, 376 F.3d at 1097; Portnoi, supra note 100, at 300. The second type of 
injunction is a “statutory injunction,” which is where a statute either prohibits certain conduct or 
establishes certain rights enforceable through court injunction, and sets forth the standard for do-
ing so. See Klay, 376 F.3d at 1098. The third type is an “All Writs Act injunction,” and may be 
issued by a court whenever it is “calculated in [the court’s] sound judgment to achieve the ends of 
justice entrusted to it.” Id. at 1099–1100 (alteration in original) (quoting Adams, 317 U.S. at 273); 
see, e.g., United States v. Yielding, 657 F.3d 722, 727 (8th Cir. 2011); Barton, 569 F.2d at 1358–
59. Regardless of the form, an injunction may be either mandatory, which command performance, 
or prohibitory, which forbid or constrain certain acts. See Sanchez v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 572 
F.3d 1, 20 (1st Cir. 2009); Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., 454 F.3d 108, 114 
(2d Cir. 2006); 1-10A MOORE’S MANUAL, supra note 99, § 10A.05. 
 104 See Klay, 376 F.3d at 1100; Portnoi, supra note 100, at 300–01; see also Barton, 569 F.2d 
at 1359 (“Conversely, conduct not shown to be detrimental to the court’s jurisdiction or exercise 
thereof could not have been enjoined under the [All Writs Act].” (alteration in original)). Although 
the two forms’ functions are substantially the same, a court issuing an injunction under the Act 
need not consider the traditional four injunction requirements, because the injunction is ancillary 
to the original proceeding. See Klay, 376 F.3d at 1100–02 
 105 See Klay, 376 F.3d at 1100; Portnoi, supra note 100, at 300–01. Thus, the scope of a 
court’s authority to enjoin under the act largely depends on “the nature of the case before [it] and 
the legitimacy of the ends sought to be achieved through the exercise of the power.” Barton, 569 
F.2d at 1358–59 (alteration in original). 
 106 See Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1229 (11th Cir. 2005); Pa. Bu-
reau of Corr., 474 U.S. at 43. If relief sought is in essence a preliminary injunction or a temporary 
restraining order, for example, the All Writs Act is not available because Rule 65 of the Rules of 
Civil Procedure provides for temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions. See FED. R. 
CIV. P. 65(a)-(b); Schiavo, 403 F.3d at 1229. 
 107 See Brown v. Gilmore, 533 U.S. 1301, 1303 (2001); In re Application of U.S. for Order 
Authorizing Disclosure of Location Info. (In re Application for Location Info. (D. Md.)), 849 F. 
Supp. 2d 526, 583 (D. Md. 2011); Portnoi, supra note 100, at 299; see also Ohio Citizens for 
Responsible Energy, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 479 U.S. 1312, 1313–14 (1986) 
(“[A]pplicant must demonstrate . . . relief is ‘necessary or appropriate in aid of [the Court’s] juris-
diction[n].” (alteration in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a))). 
 108 See In re Application for Location Info. (D. Md.), 849 F. Supp. 2d at 580; Sousa, supra 
note 93, at 113; Portnoi, supra note 100, at 299. 
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B. The All Writs Act in the Federal District Courts: General Requirements 
Generally, the All Writs Act imbues federal courts with flexible, inher-
ently equitable powers subject to judicial discretion.109 This discretion is in-
formed by several fundamental limitations and equitable considerations.110 
Most courts and commentators have recognized four elements to consider, 
with some slight variation, before an All Writs order may be properly is-
sued.111 In short, an All Writs order may only be issued where (1) no other 
law applies; (2) the issuing court has jurisdiction over the underlying matter 
on an independent basis and the order is “in aid of” that jurisdiction; (3) 
exceptional circumstances are present that make issuance under the Act 
necessary or appropriate; and (4) the issuance of relief is done in conformity 
with the “usages and principles of law.”112 
The first limitation is derived from the Act’s residual nature, as its au-
thority may only be invoked as a gap-filling measure to order action not 
otherwise covered by statute.113 Although no such limiting language explic-
itly appears in the statutory text, historically this notion is consistent with 
                                                                                                                           
 109 See Clinton, 526 U.S. at 537 (“The All Writs Act invests a court with a power essentially 
equitable . . . .”); N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 173 (noting that the Court has consistently applied the 
Act flexibly); United States v. George, 676 F.3d 249, 253 (1st Cir. 2012) (noting that the flexible, 
inherently equitable powers imbued to the courts through the Act “are anchored in informed judi-
cial discretion”). 
 110 See Sousa, supra note 93, at 113–14; Portnoi, supra note 100, at 297–98; see also Morrow 
v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728, 736 (D.D.C. 1969) (“The Supreme Court has stressed the 
theme that the issuance of the writ is a matter of sound discretion.”). 
 111 In re Application for Location Info. (D. Md.), 849 F. Supp. 2d at 580; Sousa, supra note 
93, at 113–14; Portnoi, supra note 100, at 299–303. 
 112 See In re Application for Location Info. (D. Md.), 849 F. Supp. 2d at 582; Sousa, supra 
note 93, at 113–14; Portnoi, supra note 100, at 299–303. Although this area of the law is under-
theorized in secondary literature, and no fully consistent articulation of the prerequisites for an All 
Writs Act injunction has been announced by the lower courts, this formulation can be reasonably 
construed from the statutory text of the Act and the Supreme Court’s interpretation. See Portnoi, 
supra note 100, at 299. Additionally, potential constitutional implications must be considered in 
the context of a criminal proceeding or government investigation, but such a consideration is con-
sistent with the fourth factor previously listed. See In re Application for Location Info. (D. Md.), 
849 F. Supp. 2d at 580–81; see also Portnoi, supra note 100, at 303 (noting that the only guidance 
the statute provides is that orders may only be issued that are “agreeable to the usages and princi-
ples of law”). To issue an injunction that would impede on the Fourth Amendment privacy rights 
of the target of a government investigation, for example, would not be agreeable to the usages and 
principles of law. See In re Application for Location Info. (D. Md.), 849 F. Supp. 2d at 580–81. 
 113 See Pa. Bureau of Corr., 474 U.S. at 43 (“Where a statute specifically addresses the par-
ticular issue at hand, it is that authority, and not the All Writs Act, that is controlling.”); In re 
Application for Location Info. (D. Md.), 849 F. Supp. 2d at 580; Portnoi, supra note 100, at 298–
99; see also Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32 (2002) (“[T]he All Writs Act 
‘fill[s] the interstices of federal judicial power when those gaps threate[n] to thwart the otherwise 
proper exercise of federal courts’ jurisdiction.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Pa. Bureau of 
Corr., 474 U.S. at 41)). 
1424 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 57:1403 
congressional intent and the spirit of separation of powers.114 In 1985, the 
U.S. Supreme Court made clear in Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction v. 
United States Marshals Service, that “[w]here a statute specifically address-
es the particular issue at hand, it is that authority, and not the All Writs Act, 
that is controlling.”115 Thus, if a suitable remedy is available by some other 
means, the courts’ authority under the Act should be precluded.116 
Second, an order under the Act may only be issued “in aid of” the issu-
ing court’s jurisdiction.117 Once jurisdiction is vested in a federal court on an 
independent basis, that court may invoke the All Writs act “to enter orders it 
deems necessary or appropriate to preserve and protect its jurisdiction.”118 
                                                                                                                           
 114 See Pa. Bureau of Corr., 474 U.S. at 41–42; Portnoi, supra note 100, at 298; see also Ste-
venson v. Tyco Int’l (US) Inc., No. 04-4037, 2006 WL 2827635, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2006) 
(holding the All Writs Act inapplicable where the Federal Arbitration Act divests federal courts of 
jurisdiction where parties properly request arbitration); William F. Ryan, Rush to Judgment: A 
Constitutional Analysis of Time Limits on Judicial Decisions, 77 B.U. L. REV. 761, 777 n.66 
(1997) (“Congress, too, has always recognized that the federal courts would inevitably encounter 
procedural gaps, and has in various ways empowered the courts to fill those voids. This is clearly 
the purpose of the famous All Writs Act . . . .”). Section 14 of the First Judiciary Act contained the 
limiting phrase “not specifically provided for by statute,” but that language was removed in the 
1948 recodification. See Pa. Bureau of Corr., 474 U.S. at 41–42. The Supreme Court made clear 
in Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction v. United States Marshals Service that its omission from the 
All Writs Act was merely a “necessary change[] in phraseology,” and the limitation was still ap-
plicable. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 80-308, at A144 (1947)). 
 115 Pa. Bureau of Corr., 474 U.S. at 43; see also Clinton, 526 U.S. at 537 (“The All Writs Act 
invests a court with a power essentially equitable and, as such, not generally available to provide 
alternatives to other, adequate remedies at law.”). The Court went on to add that any authority 
under the Act should be reserved for filling “statutory interstices,” rather than issuing “ad hoc 
writs” whenever compliance with alternative procedures appears inconvenient or less appropriate. 
Pa. Bureau of Corr., 474 U.S. at 41, 43. 
 116 See Clinton, 526 U.S. at 537 (1999); Pa. Bureau of Corr., 474 U.S. at 43; see also Harris, 
394 U.S. at 298–301 (holding that the All Writs Act authorized an order to a party in a habeas 
corpus proceeding to answer interrogatories propounded by a state prisoner, after finding that no 
other statute addressed the relief being sought and an extension of the federal discovery rules 
would have been unsuitable); In re Application of the U.S. for an Order (1) Authorizing the Use of 
Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device, 396 F. Supp. 2d 294, 326 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (declining to 
invoke the All Writs Act where existing statutes addressed the type of investigative orders sought 
by the government). This first factor has alternatively been characterized as requiring a showing of 
an “absence of alternative remedies.” Portnoi, supra note 100, at 299; see also Sousa, supra note 
93, at 113 (adopting Portnoi’s articulation of the “absence of alternative remedies” requirement). 
 117 See Clinton, 526 U.S. at 534–35; In re Application for Location Info. (D. Md.), 849 
F. Supp. 2d at 581; Portnoi, supra note 100, at 301–02; see also Brittingham v. Comm’r, 451 F.2d 
315, 317 (5th Cir. 1971) (noting that the All Writs Act does not create jurisdiction in the district 
courts, but empowers them to issue writs in aid of jurisdiction previously acquired on some inde-
pendent ground). 
 118 E.g., In re Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register, 538 F.2d 956, 961 (2d Cir. 1976), 
rev’d on other grounds, sub nom. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 172; Portnoi, supra note 100, at 301–
02; see also Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1073 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (“Federal courts 
have both the inherent power and the constitutional obligation to protect their jurisdiction from 
conduct which impairs their ability to carry out Article III functions.”). The Supreme Court has 
made clear that the All Writs Act is not a source of subject-matter jurisdiction in and of itself. See 
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This inquiry becomes slightly more involved where the relief sought is a fur-
ther order to effectuate a previously issued order, warrant, or judgment.119 In 
this context, there must be some previously issued court order, unable to be 
implemented, that necessitates a further order to aid in its execution.120 
Third, after determining that no other law occupies the space and there 
is an independent basis for jurisdiction, courts consider whether issuance 
under the Act is “necessary or appropriate.”121 This has often required a 
showing of “exceptional circumstances” that makes relief necessary to pro-
tect the issuing court’s jurisdiction.122 This inquiry often involves a combi-
nation of some identifiable threat to a court’s jurisdiction, such as refusal to 
comply with a previous order, and lack of readily available alternative 
mechanisms for mitigating that threat.123 Further considerations in conduct-
                                                                                                                           
United States v. Denado, 556 U.S. 904, 913–14 (2009); Syngenta Crop, 537 U.S. at 33. In the 
context of ongoing proceedings this is generally a subtle issue, as jurisdiction has clearly been 
established and orders under the Act may be directed to immediate parties if found necessary or 
appropriate to manage the case to a just resolution. See N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 188 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting in part); Barton, 569 F.2d at 1359. 
 119 See N.Y. Tel Co., 434 U.S. at 172; In re U.S. for Order Directing Provider of Commc’n 
Serv. to Provide Tech. Assistance to Agents of DEA (In re Order Provide Tech. Assistance to 
DEA (D. P.R.)), 128 F. Supp. 3d 478, 483 (D. P.R. 2015) (refusing to issue an order under the All 
Writs Act where the government failed to assert the existence of a previously issued court order or 
warrant that would be frustrated by a third party’s lack of cooperation). 
 120 See Klay, 376 F.3d at 1100; In re Order Provide Tech. Assistance to DEA (D. P.R.), 128 
F. Supp. 3d at 483; United States v. X (U.S. v. X), 601 F. Supp. 1039, 1042–43 (D. Md. 1984); see 
also Mitsubishi Intern. Corp. v. Cardinal Textile Sales, Inc. 14 F.3d 1507, 1517 n.17 (11th Cir. 
1994) (“Conduct not shown to be detrimental to the court’s jurisdiction or exercise thereof cannot 
be enjoined under the Act.”). 
 121 See N.Y. Tel Co., 434 U.S. at 173, 175; In re Application for Location Info. (D. Md.), 849 
F. Supp. 2d at 581; U.S. v. X, 601 F. Supp. at 1042–43; Portnoi, supra note 100, at 302–03. 
 122 See Pa. Bureau of Corr., 474 U.S. at 44–45 (Stevens, J., dissenting); In re Application for 
Location Info. (D. Md.), 849 F. Supp. 2d at 581. The extraordinary nature of relief pursuant to the 
Act calls for courts to inquire whether the petition before them presents exceptional circumstances 
that make the Act’s invocation necessary and appropriate. See Alabama v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Eng’rs, 424 F.3d 1117, 1132 n.22 (11th Cir. 2005) (“The exceptional circumstances that have 
supported injunctions against related proceedings under the All Writs Act are not present here.”); 
Liles v. Del Campo, 350 F.3d 742, 746–47 (8th Cir. 2003) (affirming the district court’s authority 
under the All Writs Act to enjoin related federal proceedings in order to preserve the settlement 
fund of defendants involved in a conditional nationwide class action, to avoid inconsistent results, 
and to preserve judicial resources); U.S. v. X, 601 F. Supp. at 1043 (finding exceptional circum-
stances where a defendant had “disappeared,” efforts to locate him had been unsuccessful, and 
records collected under a pen register would likely lead to his whereabouts). 
 123 See Klay, 376 F.3d at 1100; Portnoi, supra note 100, at 299–300. The Supreme Court has 
consistently maintained that the primary purpose of the Act is to enable courts to protect their 
jurisdiction. See Clinton, 526 U.S. at 534; Harris, 394 U.S. at 299; Sousa, supra note 93, at 113. 
In 1977, in United States v. New York Telephone Co., Justice White, writing for the majority of the 
Supreme Court, rejected the dissent’s attempt to draw a distinction between orders in aid of a 
court’s own duties and jurisdiction and orders designed to better enable a party to effectuate his or 
her own rights and duties. See N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 175 n.23 (“[C]ourts normally exercise 
their jurisdiction only in order to protect the legal rights of parties.”). Thus, although the Act is not 
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ing this inquiry include whether there are less intrusive means available to 
accomplish the purpose of the request; whether other means have been at-
tempted and were unsuccessful; and the likelihood that issuance of an in-
junction under the Act will successfully accomplish the purported goal of 
the requested order.124 Overall, the inquiry is a flexible one, but subject to 
sound discretion.125 For example, in Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction, the 
Court held that the All Writs Act did not authorize a district court to order 
the U.S. Marshals Service to transport and supervise a witness being held in 
a state correctional custody to effectuate a previously issued habeas corpus 
order.126 The Court concluded that the district court was not authorized to 
do so because no “exceptional circumstances” were demonstrated that sug-
gested the state could not handle transporting the witness to the federal 
courthouse itself.127 
Fourth, after finding sufficient exceptional circumstances that make an 
All Writs injunction necessary or appropriate, a court must fashion a reme-
                                                                                                                           
broadly available as a remedy to protect a parties rights, the Act’s purpose of preserving the issu-
ing court’s jurisdiction most often has the simultaneous effect of protecting parties’ rights. See id. 
 124 See In re Application for Location Info. (D. Md.), 849 F. Supp. 2d at 581–82. 
 125 See Klay, 376 F.3d at 1100 (“A court may grant relief under the Act whenever it is ‘calcu-
lated in [the court’s] sound judgment to achieve the ends of justice entrusted to it,’ and not only 
when it is ‘necessary in the sense that the court could not otherwise physically discharge its . . . 
duties.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Adams, 317 U.S. at 273)); see also United States v. 
Catoggio, 698 F.3d 64, 67 (2d Cir. 2012) (citation omitted) (“[C]ourts have significant flexibility 
in exercising their authority under the Act.”). 
 126 See Pa. Bureau of Corr., 474 U.S. at 43. The Court found that the pertinent habeas corpus 
provision at issue did not empower a court to direct third parties, who are neither custodians nor 
parties to the litigation, to bear the cost of producing the prisoner in a federal court. See id. at 39. 
 127 See id. at 43. The Court left open the question of whether certain exceptional circumstanc-
es, such as serious security risks, may render traditional habeas statutes inadequate and justify a 
court’s invocation of the All Writs Act to transport state prisoners. See id. Some lower courts have 
interpreted this language to suggest that issuance under the All Writs Act is only authorized when 
circumstances demonstrate an exceptional need for its invocation, although prior courts tended to 
apply the All Writs Act in the same manner. See In re Application for Location Info. (D. Md.), 849 
F. Supp. 2d at 581–82; In re Application of U.S. for Order Directing X to Provide Access to Vide-
otapes (In re Order X to Provide Access to Videotapes (D. Md.)), No. 03-89, 2003 WL 22053105, 
at *3 (D. Md. Aug. 22, 2003) (finding sufficient exceptional circumstances present where arrest 
warrant had issued for defendant, agent stated that defendant had disappeared, efforts to locate 
defendant had been unsuccessful, and it was likely that an order under the Act directing nonparty 
to provide access security videotapes would provide information regarding defendant’s wherea-
bouts); U.S. v. X, 601 F. Supp. at 1042–43 (finding exceptional circumstances where a defendant 
had “disappeared,” efforts to locate him had been unsuccessful, and an order directing third-party 
service provider to disclose records collected under a pen register would likely lead to his wherea-
bouts because he was likely to use his phone to contact his family); see also Davis v. Glanton, 107 
F.3d 1044, 1047 n.4 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting that a district court may only invoke the All Writs Act 
to remove an otherwise unremovable state court action when there is a showing of “exceptional 
circumstances”). 
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dy that is “agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”128 This largely 
depends on the context in which the order is being issued, but generally, any 
order issued under the Act cannot offend established common law princi-
ples relative to the particular relief being sought, or otherwise be in viola-
tion of any statutory or constitutional provision.129 For example, in the con-
text of criminal proceedings or government investigations, courts must de-
termine whether any constitutional provisions are implicated by the pro-
posed order.130 Where no Fourth Amendment privacy rights or other consti-
tutional issues are implicated, however, courts have invoked the All Writs 
Act to order third-party assistance in effectuating previously issued search 
and arrest warrants.131 
                                                                                                                           
 128 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a); see Sousa, supra note 93, at 114; Portnoi, supra note 100, at 303; see 
also Riggs v. Johnson, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 166, 190, 194 (1867) (noting that the single restriction on 
the courts’ authority to exercise its jurisdiction is that the form and mode of process be agreeable 
to the principles and usages of law as known to both common law and the law of the various states 
at the time of the Act’s enactment). 
 129 See United States v. Perry, 360 F.3d 519, 534 (6th Cir. 2004); Sousa, supra note 93, at 
114; Portnoi, supra note 100, at 303; see also Paramount Film Distrib. Corp. v. Civic Ctr. Theatre, 
Inc., 333 F.2d 358, 360 (10th Cir. 1964) (“The exercise of the power [under the All Writs Act] . . . 
is necessarily one of discretion, and is in accordance with the established principles relative to the 
particular writ which is sought.” (alteration in original)). But see In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d 
at 357–59. (declining to adopt the interpretation of “agreeable to the usages and principles of law” 
as meaning anything not prohibited by law; and instead adopting a construction meaning “conso-
nant with both the manner in which the laws were developed . . . and the manner in which the laws 
have been interpreted and implemented”). When issuing an injunction pursuant to the Act, courts 
are not authorized to issue injunctive relief “beyond what has traditionally been exercised by 
courts of equity.” See Papadopoulos v. Sidi, 547 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1270 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (quoting 
Rosen v. Cascade Intern., Inc., 21 F.3d 1520, 1528 n.15 (11th Cir. 1994)). 
 130 See Perry, 360 F.3d at 534; In re Application for Location Info. (D. Md.), 849 F. Supp. 2d 
at 580–81. The Fourth and Fifth Amendments are the constitutional provisions most likely to be 
implicated with the issuance of a court order to provide information or perform some action, such 
as assisting in the execution of a search warrant. See In re Application for Location Info. (D. Md.), 
849 F. Supp. 2d at 581; supra notes 56–62 and accompanying text (discussing the applicability of 
the Fourth and Fifth Amendment with respect to government searches of cellphones). The Act 
does not relieve the government of its burden of establishing probable cause and complying with 
warrant requirements where constitutionally protected information is sought. See In re Application 
for Location Info. (D. Md.), 849 F. Supp. 2d at 581. Just as litigants may not sidestep statutory 
requirements by resorting to motion under the All Writs Act, the government may not sidestep 
constitutional restraints by seeking relief under the Act. See Syngenta Crop, 537 U.S. at 32–33; In 
re Application for Location Info. (D. Md.), 849 F. Supp. 2d at 581. 
 131 See In re Application for Location Info. (D. Md.), 849 F. Supp. 2d at 581; U.S. v. X, 601 
F. Supp. at 1042–43; see also In re Order X to Provide Access to Videotapes (D. Md.), 2003 WL 
22053105, at *2 (ordering production of video surveillance of public areas in an apartment com-
plex, finding no reasonable expectation of privacy on the part of the tenants or their hallway visi-
tors, and cooperation by the apartment complex would not be burdensome); Doe, 537 F. Supp. at 
839–40 (issuing an order under the All Writs Act authorizing the production of toll records finding 
no reasonable expectation of privacy on the part of the subscribers). 
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C. Compelling Third Parties to Provide Assistance to the Government 
The All Writs Act can be used to order nonparties to either assist or re-
frain from frustrating a previously issued warrant, even where there has 
been no affirmative interference.132 In 1977, in United States v. New York 
Telephone Co., the U.S. Supreme Court held that a district court had author-
ity under the Act to issue an order requiring a public telephone company to 
provide technical assistance to the FBI in its effort to install a pen register 
on two telephone lines pursuant to a previously issued warrant.133 The Court 
determined that the Act authorized the district court to issue the second or-
der directing assistance, because it was necessary to prevent the warrant 
from being nullified, thus aiding in the courts jurisdiction to enable the au-
thorized surveillance.134 This determination hinged on the Court’s conclu-
sion that the telephone company was not a third party “so far removed” 
from the underlying investigation that its assistance could not be permissi-
bly compelled.135 The Court further noted that compliance would require 
                                                                                                                           
 132 See N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 174; United States v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 616 
F.2d 1122, 1128 (9th Cir. 1980); Plum Creek Lumber Co. v. Hutton, 608 F.2d 1283, 1289 (9th 
Cir. 1979); see also Ass’n for Retarded Citizens of Conn., Inc. v. Thorne, 30 F.3d 367, 370 (2d 
Cir. 1994) (“By power of the All Writs Act, [a court] may require the compliance of nonparties in 
order to ensure that its legally-mandated directives are not frustrated.” (alteration in original)); 
Doe, 537 F. Supp. at 839 (using the All Writs Act to order telephone company to supply telephone 
toll records in order to help effectuate a bench warrant for defendant’s arrest); In re XXX, Inc., 
2014 WL 5510865, at *1–2 (issuing an order under the All Writs Act directing cellphone manu-
facturer to assist in the execution of a search warrant by “bypassing the lock screen” of subject’s 
cellphone). 
 133 See N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 174–78. A “pen register” is a device used to record numbers 
dialed on a telephone by measuring electronic impulses caused when the dial of the telephone is 
released. See id. at 161 n.1. The case before the Court arose from the telephone company’s refusal 
to fully comply with a previously issued order from the district court, which directed it to furnish 
the FBI all information, facilities, and technical assistance necessary to use the pen registers unob-
trusively. Id. at 162. The FBI contended that it needed the assistance of the company in order to 
successfully install the pen register on the target lines without alerting the suspects. See id. at 162–
63. 
 134 See id. at 175 & n.23. The court noted that there was no conceivable way the FBI could 
install the pen register on its own without tipping off the targets of the investigation. See id. Be-
fore reaching this conclusion, the Court rejected the telephone company’s argument that pen regis-
ters may only be authorized in conformity with Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act of 1968 (“The Wiretap Act”). See id. at 165–67; Brian L. Owsley, Triggerfish, Sting-
rays, and Fourth Amendment Fishing Expeditions, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 183, 195 (2014). The Court 
concluded that Title III was only concerned with orders authorizing “interception of wire commu-
nication,” and that pen registers did not fit within the meaning of the statute because they only 
disclose the telephone numbers that have been dialed. See N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 166–67. 
 135 See N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 174–75 (“[I]t can hardly be contended that the [c]ompany 
. . . had a substantial interest in not providing assistance.”). In applying this standard, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has determined that “the All Writs Act requires no more 
than that the persons enjoined . . . have the ‘minimum contacts’ that are constitutionally required 
under due process.” United States v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 907 F.2d 277, 281 (2d Cir. 1990); 
see United States v. Mason Tenders Dist. Council of Greater N.Y., 205 F. Supp. 2d 183, 188 (2d 
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minimal effort on the company’s part, and the compelled assistance would 
not disrupt the company’s operations.136 Furthermore, the Court also recog-
nized the limits to the district court’s authority to issue such orders, and not-
ed that “unreasonable burdens may not be imposed.”137 
Although the practical import of New York Telephone Co. in the con-
text of pen-register surveillance has largely dissipated, the Court’s rationale 
regarding the All Writs Act has survived.138 New York Telephone Co. still 
stands for the contention that the All Writs Act empowers federal courts to 
order a nonparty to an investigation to provide technical assistance to effec-
tuate a prior order or warrant.139 Despite this purported authority, lower 
                                                                                                                           
Cir. 2002). But see In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d at 368 (concluding that the requisite “mini-
mum contacts,” for the purposes of establishing personal jurisdiction, and the “too far removed” 
standard articulated in New York Telephone Co. are not coextensive). 
 136 N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 175. The Court rejected the concern that such a holding could 
establish an undesirable precedent for federal courts’ authority to impress unwilling aid on third 
parties. See id. at 164, 175 n.24. The Court noted that the conviction that private citizens have a 
duty to provide assistance to law enforcement officials in necessary situations has been generally 
accepted by common-law traditions. See id. at 175 n.24. 
 137 Id. at 172. In the wake of New York Telephone Co., lower courts recognized that such 
assistance orders cannot be compelled without providing the target of the order a right to be heard. 
See Mountain States Tel., 616 F.2d at 1132–33; In re Installation of a Pen Register or Touch-Tone 
Decoder & Terminating Trap (In re Pen Register or Touch-Tone (3d Cir.)), 610 F.2d 1148, 1157 
(3d Cir. 1779). These three aforementioned factors—(1) how “far removed” the target of the order 
is from the underlying matter; (2) the amount of effort required for the requested action, and its 
potential disruption to business operations; and (3) the necessity of the order in aiding the court’s 
jurisdiction—have been referred to as the New York Telephone Co. “discretionary factors.” See In 
re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d at 363–64. The degree of permissible burden is ultimately up to the 
district court’s discretion, but at least one federal appeals court has directed lower courts to give 
considerable weight to the “sui generis character” of the technical assistance requested and the 
extent to which the target entity is regulated. See Mountain States Tel., 616 F.2d at 1132. 
 138 See In re Application of U.S. for Order Authorizing (1) Installation and Use of Pen Register 
and Trap Device or Process (In re Application of U.S. (S.D. Tex)), 441 F. Supp. 2d 816, 830–31 (S.D. 
Tex. 2006). Due to subsequent developments in federal case law and legislation, the All Writs Act 
soon became obsolete in the context of pen-register surveillance, which has been regulated by the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”) since 1986. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–3127 (2012); 
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979); In re Application of U.S. (S.D. Tex), 441 F. Supp. 
2d at 831; Owsley, supra note 134, at 196. Nothing in the ECPA or its history suggests dissatisfac-
tion with either the holding or rationale of New York Telephone Co. See In re Application of U.S. 
(S.D. Tex), 441 F. Supp. 2d at 818–19, 831. 
 139 See, e.g., In re XXX, Inc., 2014 WL 5510865, at *1–2; see also United States v. Fricosu, 
841 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1238 (D. Col. 2012) (issuing an order under the All Writs Act requiring 
defendant to provide password to encrypted computer seized pursuant to a search warrant). Some 
lower courts have been skeptical to endorse such an expansive view of the judiciary’s authority 
under the Act. See In re Order Requiring Apple, Inc. Assist in Execution of Search Warrant (In re 
Apple—Preliminary Mem. and Order), No. 1:15-mc-01902, 2015 WL 5920207, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 9, 2015) (preliminary memorandum and order). Others have issued All Writs orders in sup-
port of previously issued warrants in a wide variety of contexts See Mountain States Tel., 616 F.2d 
at 1129–30 (affirming the district court’s order directing a phone company to assist with a trap and 
trace device); In re Pen Register or Touch-Tone (3d Cir.), 610 F.2d at 1155 (same); In re Order X 
to Provide Access to Videotapes (D. Md.), 2003 WL 22053105, at *3 (ordering a landlord to pro-
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courts have generally held that procedural guarantees of due process require 
notice and a hearing on the issue of burdensomeness before assistance can 
be compelled. 140 An order shall not issue if the assistance sought would be 
unreasonably burdensome to the nonparty.141 The degree of burdensome-
ness can be determined by balancing the government’s need for assistance 
against the nonparty’s interest in its own autonomy.142 
III. SOUR APPLES: APPLE FINALLY BUCKS GOVERNMENT’S ORDER 
APPLICATIONS UNDER THE ALL WRITS ACT 
On October 8, 2015, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District 
of New York, the government sought an order, pursuant to the All Writs Act, 
to direct Apple to bypass the lock-screen passcode of an iPhone 5s running 
on iOS 7, in order to effectuate a previously issued search warrant.143 In a 
                                                                                                                           
vide access to security camera videotapes); United States v. Hall, 583 F. Supp. 717, 722 (E.D. Va. 
1984) (ordering a credit card company to produce customer records); U.S. v. X, 601 F. Supp. at 
1042–43 (same); Doe, 537 F. Supp. at 839–40 (ordering a phone company to produce telephone 
toll records). 
 140 See Mountain States Tel., 616 F.2d at 1132–33; In re Pen Register or Touch-Tone (3d 
Cir.), 610 F.2d at 1157; In re XXX, Inc., 2014 WL 5510865, at *2. To the extent the nonparty 
believes the order to be unduly burdensome, or that it should be reimbursed for expenses, courts 
have noted that the order should contain clear notice that the opportunity for objection is available. 
See In re XXX, Inc., 2014 WL 5510865, at *2. 
 141 See N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 172; In re Pen Register or Touch-Tone (3d Cir.), 610 F.2d at 
1157; see also In re U.S. for Order Authorizing Roving Interception of Oral Commc’ns, 349 F.3d 
1132, 1145 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The obligation of private citizens to assist law enforcement, even if 
they are compensated for the immediate costs of doing so, has not extended to circumstances in 
which there is a complete disruption of a service they offer to a customer as part of their business 
. . . .”); In re Apple—Preliminary Mem. and Order, 2015 WL 5920207, at *6 (discussing case law 
in which courts have considered the extent of intrusion that constitutes “unreasonably burden-
some”). 
 142 See N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 174–75; In re Pen Register or Touch-Tone (3d Cir.), 610 
F.2d at 1155. Relevant factors for determining reasonableness have included: (1) the likelihood of 
obtaining probative evidence; (2) available alternatives for accessing the information; (3) the ex-
tent to which assistance would disrupt operations or a commercial service; (4) the extent to which 
the invasiveness implicated by the execution of the order can be curtailed; (5) whether there is 
probable cause that the nonparty’s facilities are being used for a criminal purpose; (6) whether the 
nonparty operates in a regulated industry; and (7) the likelihood that the nonparty can be compen-
sated for assistance. See N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 174–75; In re Pen Register or Touch-Tone (3d 
Cir.), 610 F.2d at 1155 (finding All Writs Act assistance order to be appropriate and not overly 
burdensome where refusal would completely preclude execution of the warrant; assistance would 
cause “minimal disruption of normal operations;” and the telephone companies at issue would be 
fully compensated); see also Mountain States Tel., 616 F.2d at 1133 (providing a variation of 
those factors in dicta). 
 143 In re Order Requiring Apple, Inc. Assist in Execution of Search Warrant (In re Apple—
Preliminary Mem. and Order, No. 1:15-mc-01902, 2015 WL 5920207, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 
2015) (preliminary memorandum and order); In re Apple, Inc., Transcript of Oct. 26, 2015, supra 
note 14, at 33. The underlying warrant had been issued on July 6, 2015, by a U.S. Magistrate 
judge in the Eastern District of New York, and authorized the government to search the phone for 
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memorandum and order on October 9, 2015, the court questioned the gov-
ernment’s assertion that the Act supported the relief being sought, noting 
that the relied-upon authority, particularly the 1977 U.S. Supreme Court 
case, United States v. New York Telephone Co., suggested that it did not.144 
On February 29, 2016, following further briefing and argument on the pro-
priety of the Act’s authority and the issue of burdensomeness, the court is-
sued a final ruling denying the government’s application.145 On March 7, 
2016, the government appealed U.S. Magistrate Judge James Orenstein’s 
decision to the District Court, however, it subsequently withdrew its appli-
cation altogether after reporting that an unidentified individual had provided 
it with the passcode to the phone at issue.146 Section A of this Part discusses 
Judge Orenstein’s decision in In re Order Requiring Apple, Inc. Assist in 
Execution of Search Warrant (“In re Apple, Inc.”).147 Section B briefly dis-
cusses the larger significance of the holding, as almost a dozen All-Writs-
order applications against Apple were pending before other federal magis-
trates across the country at the time the ruling was entered.148 
                                                                                                                           
evidence related to the possession and distribution of methamphetamine. See In re Order Requir-
ing Apple, Inc. Assist in Execution of Search Warrant (In re Apple, Inc.), 149 F. Supp. 3d 341, 
345–46 (E.D.N.Y. 2016). After failing to access the phone themselves due to the phone’s security 
features, government agents sought assistance from Apple. Id. At that time, Apple indicated that it 
would comply with the request if the government first obtained a court order pursuant to the pro-
cess outlined on the company’s website, and made no objection to the propriety of the proposed 
order or the requested assistance. See id. at 346. Apple later submitted its initial opposition on 
October 22, 2015, after being invited to do so by the court. See id. at 346–47. At a hearing follow-
ing issuance of Judge Orenstein’s initial Memorandum and Order on October 9, 2015, the gov-
ernment clarified that what it was really seeking was “technical assistance,” including “bypass and 
process information required from Apple’s servers.” In re Apple, Inc., Transcript of Oct. 26, 2015, 
supra note 14, at 68–69. 
 144 See In re Apple—Preliminary Mem. and Order, 2015 WL 5920207, at *3, 5–7. Specifical-
ly, Judge Orenstein concluded that the opinion in United States v. New York Telephone Co. failed 
to support the government’s motion, in light of the distinguishing characteristics between that case 
and the present matter. See id. at *5–6 (distinguishing New York Telephone Co. on the grounds 
that Apple did not have present control over the device at issue; that Apple is not a regulated pub-
lic utility, and may have a discernable economic interest in not providing assistance; and that noth-
ing on the record indicated that Apple regularly performed the requested service as part of its own 
operations or that it was even possible). 
 145 See In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d at 346–47, 349. 
 146 Letter Updating the Court and the Parties by the U.S., In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d 
341 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (No. 1:15-mc-01902). Accordingly, the court denied the government’s ap-
plication as moot. Order as to Appeal of Magistrate Judge Decision to District Court, In re Apple, 
Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d 341 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (No. 1:15-mc-01902). 
 147 See infra notes 149–160 and accompanying text. 
 148 See infra notes 161–170 and accompanying text. 
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A. Magistrate Judge Orenstein: Placing the Apple Out of Reach 
Judge Orenstein’s principle holding was that the All Writs Act did not 
authorize the relief being sought, because an order compelling Apple to 
provide unwilling technical assistance would not be “agreeable to the usag-
es and principles of law,” as the Act demands.149 Judge Orenstein based this 
conclusion on a finding that Congress had sufficiently considered legisla-
tion that would require governmental access to encrypted devices but has 
declined to adopt it.150 Accordingly, Judge Orenstein concluded that grant-
ing relief under the Act would essentially be legislative in nature and repug-
nant to the doctrine of separation of powers.151 
Before reaching its conclusion, Judge Orenstein engaged in the statuto-
ry construction of the “usages and principles” provision, finding that federal 
case law offered little guidance on the matter.152 In so doing, Judge Oren-
                                                                                                                           
 149 See In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d at 349, 363–64. Before reaching his conclusion, 
Judge Orenstein quickly conceded that issuance of an order under the circumstances would nor-
mally be “necessary or appropriate” in aid of the court’s jurisdiction, because ordering such assis-
tance is not specifically proscribed by Congress and an order would be needed to effectuate the 
validly issued warrant to search the device. See id. at 349–50. Judge Orenstein may have applied the 
doctrine in a slightly different manner than what was previously discussed in this Note, but it is not 
clear that his application was entirely correct. See Orin Kerr, The Weak Main Argument in Judge 
Orenstein’s Apple Opinion, Opinion, WASH. POST (Mar. 2, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/03/02/the-weak-main-argument-in-judge-orensteins-apple-
opinion [https://perma.cc/82CH-YVWH] (expressing dissatisfaction with the legal analysis em-
ployed by Judge Orenstein and arguing that Judge Orenstein improperly treated the statutory lan-
guage as if it had not been previously constructed and interpreted it differently than it had been in 
the past by the U.S. Supreme Court). 
 150 See In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d at 355–57, 360–61, 363. Judge Orenstein’s justifica-
tion of his decision was largely a result of its construction of the “usages and principles” provi-
sion. See id. 357–59; Kerr, supra note 149. 
 151 See In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d at 349–50, 360–61, 370 n.36. Judge Orenstein noted 
that granting authority to the executive branch that Congress decided to withhold would be an 
unwarranted expansion of the Act’s original purpose of ensuring the “smooth functioning” of the 
judiciary itself. See id. at 360–61; see also Holt, supra note 94, at 1507–08 (describing section 14, 
known as the “all-writs” provision, as “the most expansive and open-ended” provision in the First 
Judiciary Act). To be sure, writs have routinely been issued for “minor” administrative purposes 
from the beginning, but have also been reserved to be used to deal with “matters of great moment” 
through the Act’s open-ended language. Holt, supra note 94, at 1507. 
 152 See In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d at 352, 357–59. But see Bank of the United States v. 
Halstead, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 51, 56 (1825) (finding the provision “embraces writs sanctioned by 
the principles and usages” under common law, but is not so limited); Kerr, supra note 149 (ana-
lyzing the Court’s interpretation of the Act in United States v. Halstead and other cases, and con-
cluding that the Court has consistently interpreted the Act to convey broad authority to the federal 
courts to issue writs beyond the forms available at common law, which will only be limited if 
Congress acts to do so). Judge Orenstein considered several cases in a footnote, but determined 
that in those cases the “usages and principles” provision was mainly concerned with whether the 
form of the writ sought was available under common law. See In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d at 
353 n.10 (citing United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 221 n.35 (1952) and Rawlins v. Kansas, 
714 F.3d 1189, 1196 (10th Cir. 2013)). 
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stein determined that the most apt interpretation of the phrase was to permit 
only those orders that are “consonant with both the manner in which the 
laws were developed . . . and the manner in which the laws have been inter-
preted and implemented . . . .”153 In recognizing the Act’s overall residual 
nature, Judge Orenstein then turned to potentially relevant legislation to 
determine whether a statutory gap had emerged that would make relief un-
der the Act appropriate.154 He agreed with both parties that the Communica-
tion Assistance to Law Enforcement Act (“CALEA”) does not require a 
company like Apple to provide assistance in this context, but diverged with 
the government’s position by concluding that the omission reflects a con-
scious choice rather than simple oversight.155 Judge Orenstein reasoned that 
CALEA is part of a larger, comprehensive scheme, and that scheme deline-
ates the boundaries within which law enforcement may seek access to data 
in-motion and data at-rest.156 He concluded that an absence of an affirma-
tive obligation on a company like Apple to assist in accessing data at rest is 
sufficient to imply a legislative decision to prohibit the imposition of such a 
duty.157 
                                                                                                                           
 153 In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d at 358. Judge Orenstein explicitly rejected the meaning 
the government had ascribed the provision, which would allow an All Writs order to issue so long 
as it is “consistent with” the law, as in not prohibited by statute. See id. at 362, 370; The Govt’s 
Post-Hearing Brief at 7, In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d 341 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (No. 1:15-mc-
01902) [hereinafter Govt’s Post-Hearing Brief]. 
 154 See In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d at 354–58. Specifically, Judge Orenstein noted that 
the boundaries of the Act’s gap-filling function could be easily drawn at two ends: (1) the Act 
cannot be interpreted to empower courts to do something already specifically authorized by anoth-
er statute, and (2) it cannot be interpreted to authorize something specifically prohibited by anoth-
er statute. See id. (citing Pa. Bureau of Corr. v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 474 U.S. 34, 43 (1985) 
(“Where a statute specifically addresses the particular issue at hand, it is that authority, and not the 
All Writs Act, that is controlling.”). 
 155 See id. 355–57, 363. To be sure, the Communication Assistance to Law Enforcement Act 
(“CALEA”) only applies to the real-time interception of communications, whereas the underlying 
warrant authorized the search of data at rest, so it is likewise arguable that CALEA is not relevant 
to the underlying matter. See 47 U.S.C. § 1002 (2012); King, supra note 79, at 178. Judge Oren-
stein acknowledged this distinction, but found it irrelevant because Congress could have and did 
enact statutes regulating collection of data at rest elsewhere. See In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d 
at 356–57 (citing the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2012)). 
 156 In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d at 356–57. Judge Orenstein further noted that if that is 
what Congress intended, it could have incorporated such an obligation as it had elsewhere. See id. 
at 356–58; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(4); 3123(b)(2) (2012) (requiring private parties to assist in 
the execution of wiretaps and pen registers under certain circumstances); 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f)(1) 
(2012) (requiring providers of electronic communication services to, upon request, preserve all 
records and other evidence in its possession for government access pending proper court authori-
zation). 
 157 See In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d at 356–58, 363. In further support of his conclusion 
that Congress had sufficiently considered the issue, Judge Orenstein cited to several specific in-
stances in which the Going Dark issue had been placed before Congress and legislative solutions 
had been discussed. See id.; In re Apple—Preliminary Mem. and Order, 2015 WL 5920207, at *2–
3. Specifically, Judge Orenstein cited to the FBI’s proposal to expand CALEA in 2009; congres-
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In dicta, Judge Orenstein further noted that even if relief was available 
under the Act as a matter of law, the requested relief would be unduly bur-
densome to Apple under the rationale of New York Telephone Co.158 Judge 
Orenstein primarily based this conclusion on the view that Apple was too 
far removed from the underlying investigation to be permissibly compelled 
to assist in execution of the warrant, and that the assistance order in this 
context would be inequitable for a number of reasons.159 Furthermore, 
Judge Orenstein concluded that the government failed to establish that Ap-
ple’s assistance in bypassing the lock screen was an absolute necessity, due 
to seemingly conflicting statements it had made in relation to the availabil-
ity of third-party technologies and hacking tools.160  
                                                                                                                           
sional hearings occurring as far back as 2011 and as recently as July 2015 in which law enforce-
ment officials had called for legislation on the matter; and the submission of three separate bills in 
2015, each of which would preclude the government from forcing assistance from Apple. See In 
re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d at 363 n.25. 
 158 See In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d at 363–64. 
 159 See id. (citing United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 172 174 (1977)). Specifically, 
Judge Orenstein noted that the record was replete with anything suggesting that Apple should be 
subject to greater regulation than any other business, and it does have a cognizable interest in 
choosing to design its products with uncompromising data security and declining to make an ex-
ception for the government. See id. at 369–70, 369 n.34. Judge Orenstein distinguished Apple 
from the telephone company in New York Telephone Co. in noting that Apple is not a highly regu-
lated public utility, and it has no ownership interest in the phone, software, or anything else be-
lieved to have been used in connection with a criminal enterprise. See id. at 363–66. Additionally, 
Judge Orenstein determined that bypassing the lock-screen of a phone is not something Apple 
would normally do in the conduct of its own business, and due to its general initiative to be a lead-
er in consumer data security, assistance could threaten its relationship with its consumers. See id. 
at 369. Thus, the situation was distinguishable from that in New York Telephone Co. Id. Similarly, 
Judge Orenstein noted that the burden on Apple would go well beyond the financial costs of di-
verting resources away from business operations, and would pose an irreconcilable threat to Ap-
ple’s autonomy. See id. at 369–71. 
 160 See id. at 373–75. Judge Orenstein was primarily concerned with the testimony of a U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) expert from another case, in which the expert indicat-
ed that the DHS was in possession of technology that would allow its forensic technicians to over-
ride the passcode of some iPhones and extract the phone’s data. See id. (citing United States v. 
Djibo, 151 F. Supp. 3d 297, 304 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)). The government further noted that in this case, 
it could not risk using the forensic tool at issue to try to guess the password, because ten unsuc-
cessful attempts may erase all of the phone’s data; and even if that feature had not been enabled, 
the government may be unable to bypass a strong password before trial. See id. at 374. Additional-
ly, the government indicated that the owner of the phone, the criminally charged in the underlying 
matter, had asserted that he forgot the password for the phone. See id. at 366 n.31. It further noted 
that even if he was not being truthful, to compel him to enter the password would raise significant 
Fifth Amendment issues, which could lead to a suppression of any evidence gathered from the 
phone. See id. Finally, the technique necessary for bypassing the phone without risking permanent 
loss of the data subject to the search warrant requires authentication from Apple servers, and can 
only be performed at Apple’s facilities in Cupertino, California. See In re Apple, Inc., Transcript 
of Oct. 26, 2015, supra note 14, at 32–33, 63–64 (“We agree with the government that the system 
requires Apple authentication.”). 
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B. Judge Orenstein Sets the Tone for the Encryption Debate in the Courts 
Prior to Judge Orenstein’s decision, Apple conceded that it has the 
ability to extract certain categories of unencrypted data from password pro-
tected devices running iOS 7 or earlier, but would not be able to do so on 
devices running on iOS 8 or higher.161 It further argued that an order to per-
form this service would be unduly burdensome if extrapolated to a signifi-
cant scale, but conceded that performing such service on one device would 
not impose any immediate financial or resource-based burden on the com-
pany.162 At oral arguments, the government indicated that since 2008, Apple 
had received and complied with at least seventy court orders requiring tech-
nical assistance pursuant to the All Writs Act.163 Apple indicated that it had 
purposefully taken itself out of a position to provide such assistance by de-
veloping iOS 8.164 According to Apple, it was now asserting its first chal-
lenge because it no longer believed that the All Writs Act provided the au-
thority the government had long claimed.165 
Between October 2015 and February 2016, at least nine additional All 
Writs orders were issued by federal courts across the country directing Ap-
ple to assist the government to bypass the passcodes of a dozen iPhones 
running on a variety of iOS versions, all pursuant to the All Writs Act.166 
Notably, in one such preliminary order involving an iOS 9 that was later 
                                                                                                                           
 161 Apple Inc.’s Response to Court’s October 9, 2015 Memorandum and Order at 3, In re 
Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (No. 1:15-mc-01902) [hereinafter Apple Inc.’s Re-
sponse] (noting that it would not have the ability to extract email, calendar entries, or any third-
party app data). 
 162 See id. at 3–4 (arguing that the burden would include: (1) allocation of man hours; 
(2) possibly requiring the Apple engineer who performed services to testify at a subsequent trial; 
and (3) a threat to the “trust between Apple and its customers [that could] substantially tarnish the 
Apple brand” (alteration in original)). 
 163 In re Apple, Inc., Transcript of Oct. 26, 2015, supra note 14, at 8–9. This estimate was 
based on an initial internal survey, “an ongoing query of government prosecutors around the coun-
try.” Id. According to Apple’s privacy policy, it did have a practice of complying with such or-
ders. See id. at 12. Attorneys from the ACLU, in its December 10, 2015 Freedom of Information 
Act Request, speculated that the vast majority of these seventy orders had been filed under seal, as 
they could not locate them on the federal dockets. Freedom of Information Act Request from Esha 
Bhandari, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, to FOIA/PA Referral Unit at 5 (Dec. 10, 
2015) [hereinafter FOIA Request], https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/foia-request-all-writs-act 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20160728235607/https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/foia-request-
all-writs-act]. When asked by the court, why it was now challenging the type of order that it had 
regularly complied with in the past, Apple replied that it “does not want to be in the business of 
being a mechanism by which customer data is disclosed.” See In re Apple, Inc., Transcript of Oct. 
26, 2015, supra note 14, at 62. 
 164 See In re Apple, Inc., Transcript of Oct. 26, 2015, supra note 14, at 58. 
 165 See id. at 59–62. 
 166 See In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d at 348; Letter in Response to Court’s February 16, 
2016 Order by Apple Inc. at 1–2, In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d 341 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (No. 
1:15-mc-01902). 
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withdrawn, a magistrate judge in the U.S. District Court for the Central Dis-
trict of California went as far as directing Apple to create and load Apple-
signed software onto the target phone to enable the government to circum-
vent the data-wiping protocol and access the phone’s data with the help of 
forensic tools.167 Many quickly voiced opposition to the order, arguing that 
forcing Apple to write software unwillingly constitutes compelled speech, 
in violation of the First Amendment.168 In re Apple, Inc. represents the first 
case in which a decision has been entered regarding the propriety of the All 
Writs Act’s authority for compelling technical assistance of this type.169 It 
remains to be seen whether the other courts will follow Judge Orenstein’s 
lead and hold the Act inapplicable as a matter of law; withhold issuance on 
the grounds of burdensomeness; or grant the relief requested and order Ap-
ple to provide technical assistance.170 
IV. THE LEGACY OF IN RE APPLE, INC. AND POTENTIAL LEGISLATIVE 
SOLUTIONS TO THE DEVICE-ENCRYPTION PROBLEM 
Despite Magistrate Judge James Orenstein’s decision in In re Order 
Requiring Apple, Inc. Assist in Execution of Search Warrant (“In re Apple, 
Inc.”), the All Writs Act is available as a matter of law to order third parties 
to provide decryption assistance.171 The Act’s availability, however, is lim-
                                                                                                                           
 167 See In re Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of Search Warrant on Black Lexus 
IS300 (The San Bernardino Shooter Case), No. ED 15-0451M, 2016 WL 618401, at *1 (C.D. Cal. 
Feb. 16, 2016); Government’s Ex Parte Application for Order Compelling Apple, Inc. to Assist 
Agents in Search at 2, The San Bernardino Shooter Case, No. ED 15-0451M, 2016 WL 680288 
(C.D. Cal. Feb., 16, 2016) [hereinafter San Bernardino Order Application]; see supra note 15 and 
accompanying text (discussing the preliminary order issued in the The San Bernardino Shooter 
Case that would have required Apple to create and load a software update onto the target device to 
disable the iPhone’s auto-erase function, and the government’s subsequent withdrawal of its ap-
plication due to a newly discovered alternative method for accessing the iPhone learned from a 
private third party). 
 168 See Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation et al. at 4, 7–14, The San Bernar-
dino Shooter Case, 2016 WL 618401 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2016) [hereinafter San Bernardino Amicus 
Brief], available at https://www.eff.org/files/2016/03/03/16cm10sp_eff_apple_v_fbi_amicus_
court_stamped.pdf [https://perma.cc/8972-NQRL] (arguing that ordering Apple to write code accord-
ing to government specifications is akin to unconstitutional compelled speech, because it is essential-
ly forcing Apple to express itself in conflict with its stated beliefs). 
 169 See In re Apple, Inc., Transcript of Oct. 26, 2015, supra note 14, at 55, 62. 
 170 See id. at 62; Devlin Barrett, Justice Department Seeks to Force Apple to Extract Data 
From About 12 Other iPhones, WALL STREET J. (Feb. 23, 2016, 12:39 PM), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/justice-department-seeks-to-force-apple-to-extract-data-from-about-12-other-iphones-145
6202213 [https://perma.cc/6PM5-GAN8]. 
 171 See, e.g., United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 174 (1977); Ass’n for Retarded 
Citizens of Conn., Inc. v. Thorne, 30 F.3d 367, 370 (2d Cir. 1994); Plum Creek Lumber Co. v. 
Hutton, 608 F.2d 1283, 1289 (9th Cir. 1979). 
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ited to situations where such assistance will not be overly burdensome.172 
Thus, a less ephemeral solution will be needed to preserve the integrity of 
the warrant process; a responsibility that lies in the hands of Congress.173 
This Part argues that Judge Orenstein’s principle holding in In re Apple, Inc. 
was incorrect and the product of improper statutory construction, however, 
obtaining assistance orders under the All Writs Act is not a viable solution 
to Going Dark in the long term.174 The All Writs Act does authorize decryp-
tion-assistance orders as long as they are issued in conjunction with a de-
vice search warrant.175 Application of the Act in this context comports with 
prior precedent, because full-disk, device encryption sits within a statutory 
gap that has only recently emerged and, in some instances, there is no feasi-
ble way to execute a warrant on an encrypted device without Apple’s assis-
tance.176  
Section A of this Part argues that Judge Orenstein improperly construed 
the “usages and principles” provision of the Act; that there is no comprehen-
sive statutory scheme that precludes the Act’s use in this context; and that the 
Act does generally authorize decryption assistance orders.177 Section B argues 
that, despite the Act’s present applicability, using the Act to compel Apple to 
unlock iPhones running on iOS 8 or higher will eventually be unavailable due 
to judicial restraint, because of the undue burden those orders are likely to 
impose.178 Section C argues that, by stripping the government of its reliance 
on the Act for unlocking iPhones, such judicial rulings should invigorate the 
push for legislative solutions to the Going Dark problem.179 It will further 
offer an amendment to the Communication Assistance to Law Enforcement 
Act (“CALEA”) that would effectively extend compliance requirements to 
device manufacturers as one possible solution.180 
                                                                                                                           
 172 See N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 172 (“[T]he power of federal courts to impose duties upon 
third parties is not without limits, unreasonable burdens may not be imposed.”). 
 173 See Corn, supra note 10, at 1437, 1444–47, 1455 (advocating for Congress to require any 
manufacturer or distributor of communications and storage technologies to build in a “split-key” 
mechanism to allow for lawful government surveillance and searches of stored data). 
 174 See infra notes 181–205 and accompanying text. 
 175 See, e.g., N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 174; Thorne, 30 F.3d at 370; Hutton, 608 F.2d at 1289. 
 176 See N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 165–67; In re Application of U.S. for Order Authorizing 
Disclosure of Location Info. (In re Application for Location Info. (D. Md.)), 849 F. Supp. 2d 526, 
580 (D. Md. 2011); Sousa, supra note 93, at 113–14; Portnoi, supra note 100, at 299. 
 177 See infra notes 181–205 and accompanying text. 
 178 See infra notes 206–211 and accompanying text. 
 179 See infra notes 212–222 and accompanying text. 
 180 See infra notes 212–222 and accompanying text. 
1438 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 57:1403 
A. Applesauce: A Questionable Construction in In re Apple, Inc. 
To reach the court’s principle holding in In re Apple, Inc., Judge Oren-
stein first constructed the “usages and principles” provision to allow only 
orders that are consistent with how the law is developed, implemented, and 
interpreted.181 This construction, however, was necessarily improper; the 
“usages and principle” provision has already been constructed by the U.S. 
Supreme Court to have a different meaning.182 The Court has long under-
stood the Act’s gap-filling function as conferring authority to federal courts 
to enlarge the effect of their process through fashioning orders as the need 
presents itself.183 Moreover, the Court has construed the “usages and princi-
ples” provision as limiting the procedural tools available under the Act to 
only orders that would (1) not be unconstitutional under the circumstances; 
(2) not be prohibited by any statute; and (3) not be prohibited by any com-
mon law principle.184 Thus, an order that may raise separation of powers 
concerns or call-to-mind certain statutes covering similar matters, would 
still be “agreeable” under that alternative construction as long as it was not 
completely offensive to the doctrine or statutorily prohibited.185 Under 
                                                                                                                           
 181 See In re Order Requiring Apple, Inc. Assist in Execution of Search Warrant (In re Apple, 
Inc.), 149 F. Supp. 3d 341, 349–54, 357–59, 363–64 (E.D.N.Y. 2016). The court did this after 
concluding that “[f]ederal case law offer[ed] little if any guidance.” Id. at 353 (alteration in origi-
nal). Under that construction, the court then considered whether an All Writs order in this context 
would be consistent with the statute’s gap-filling function against the backdrop of the “surround-
ing body of pertinent laws.” See id. at 359. 
 182 See Kerr, supra note 149; see also Riggs v. Johnson, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 166, 182, 190 
(1867) (discussing mandamus, but noting that writs may only be issued “in subordination to fixed 
principles of law,” such as comity and agreeable to the usages of law, which includes the law of 
the several States in addition to common law (emphasis added)); United States v. Halstead, 23 
U.S. (10 Wheat.) 51, 55–60 (1825) (interpreting the usages and principles provision as giving 
federal courts power to “mould their process, as to meet whatever changes might take place,” and 
concluding that courts are authorized to alter their process and enlarge the effect of its operation); 
United States v. Perry, 360 F.3d 519, 533 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting that the “usages and principles” 
provision of the All Writs Act prohibits a subsequent order from issuing that is either unconstitu-
tional, or in violation of some other statutory provision (emphasis added)). 
 183 See Halstead, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat) at 55–60; see also N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 173 
(“[T]hese supplemental powers are not limited to those situations where it is ‘necessary’ to issue 
the writ or order ‘in the sense that the court could not otherwise physically discharge its appellate 
duties.’” (quoting Adams v. U.S. ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 273 (1942))); Riggs, 73 U.S. (6 
Wall.) at 182, 190. 
 184 See Riggs, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 182, 190; Halstead, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 55–60; Perry, 
360 F.3d at 533; In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d at 357–58; Kerr, supra note 149. This alterna-
tive construction of the provision, which can be read as limiting orders under the Act to those that 
are “consistent with the law,” has more precedential support than Judge Orenstein’s, although he 
explicitly rejected the former. See Halstead, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 60–61; N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 
at 173; Perry, 360 F.3d at 533; In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d at 357–58; Kerr, supra note 149. 
 185 See Riggs, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 182, 190; Halstead, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 55–60; Perry, 
360 F.3d at 533; In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d at 357–58; Kerr, supra note 149. Issuing such 
an order could threaten the separation of powers without offending it, because if Congress disap-
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Judge Orenstein’s construction, however, such an order would not be agree-
able to “usages and principles” because it could be deemed inconsistent 
with the way laws are developed, implemented, and interpreted.186 The for-
mer construction has precedent, whereas the later has none.187 Decryption-
assistance orders, when sought to help execute a warrant, are consistent 
with that former construction because they violate no constitutional provi-
sion, statute, or common law principle.188 
For example, CALEA does not apply to password encrypted devices 
and the underlying data at rest, because it is explicitly limited to the inter-
ception of real-time communications and call-identifying information 
transmitted by telecommunications carriers.189 There may be other piece-
meal legislation that could conceivably cover decryption-assistance orders 
if amended, such as the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”), but currently 
nothing specifically addresses the propriety of obtaining data at rest from a 
                                                                                                                           
proves of the judiciaries’ actions it is within its power to impose corrective legislation. See Beers 
v. Haughton, 34 U.S. 329, 360 (1835) (8 Pet.) (approving the constitutionality of Congress’s dele-
gation to the courts); Halstead, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 60–62. 
 186 See In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d at 360–63. Furthermore, an order that seems legisla-
tive in nature, and covers an area that has partially been considered by members of Congress, 
raises sufficient concerns of judicial usurpation of the legislative prerogative to support the view 
that issuing that order would be inconsistent with the manner in which laws are developed, im-
plemented, and interpreted. See id. 
 187 See Halstead, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 60–61; N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 173; Perry, 360 
F.3d at 533; Govt’s District Court Brief, supra note 65, at 29–31; Kerr, supra note 149. 
 188 See N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 172–73; Perry, 360 F.3d at 533; Kerr, supra note 149. The 
search of the phone in this case would comply with the Fourth Amendment because the govern-
ment obtained a warrant. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014) (holding that a 
warrant is generally required to search a cellphone); In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d at 352–53. 
It is not apparent that ordering private citizens to provide assistance to law enforcement is offen-
sive to common-law principles, as the Supreme Court rejected that notion in United States v. New 
York Telephone Co. See N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 175 n. 24 (noting that private citizens have been 
called upon the state, in certain situations, to assist in the enforcement of justice since the days of 
Edward I). 
 189 47 U.S.C. § 1002 (2012); King, supra note 79, at 178; see United States v. Steiger 318 
F.3d 1039, 1047 (11th Cir. 2003) (noting that the term “intercept” applies only to “acquisitions 
contemporaneous with transmission”); The Government’s Reply at 22–23, In re Apple, Inc., 149 
F. Supp. 3d 341 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (No. 1:15-mc-01902) [hereinafter Govt’s Reply Brief]; Hibbard, 
supra note 76, at 374–75. Particularly, CALEA does not apply to information service providers 
like Apple, or to the type of physical assistance sought by the government in this case, and it con-
fers no independent authority upon the federal courts to issue assistance orders. See 47 U.S.C. 
§ 1002(a); Govt’s Reply Brief, supra, at 22–23. Furthermore, even if Apple is considered an in-
formation service provider under the exemption provision, the exemption only pertains to the 
capability requirements. See 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a); Govt’s Reply Brief, supra, at 22–23. Further-
more, the other third-party assistance statutes in the statutory scheme to which Judge Orenstein 
refers, all cover very specific types of governmental acquisitions, none of which can be reasonably 
construed as decidedly omitting compelled assistance in bypassing the lock-screen of an encrypted 
device. See Govt’s Reply Brief, supra, at 22–23 nn.5–6; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f)(1) (2012) 
(requiring assistance to government acquisition of electronically stored data in the providers pos-
session). 
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smartphone beyond the typical warrant requirements.190 Moreover, no pro-
visions of CALEA or the SCA have been updated since 1996 and 2006, re-
spectively.191 The iPhone was not released until 2007, and it was not offered 
with full-disk encryption (“FDE”) or remote-wiping capabilities until 
2009.192 Thus, the further development of FDE and data-wipe features since 
2009 has created a clear statutory gap.193 There was no substantial need to 
seek this type of conscripted assistance prior to those developments, be-
cause few data was actually being encrypted at first and passcodes could be 
bypassed via simple forensic tools.194 For more securely encrypted phones, 
Apple regularly provided assistance to the authorities.195 Therefore, the spe-
cific practical inabilities presented in In re Apple, Inc. were largely non-
existent until very recently, so it is difficult to see how they could have been 
explicitly omitted from legislation after being fully considered.196 
Although some members of Congress have been aware of the Going 
Dark issue since at least 2011, congressional hearings prior to 2015 focused 
more predominantly on the difficulties of intercepting real-time data in mo-
tion, rather than those associated with obtaining data at rest from physical 
devices.197 The difference is significant under the United States v. New York 
Telephone Co. framework, where the U.S. Supreme Court in 1977 explicitly 
rejected the argument that pen registers could only be obtained through the 
seemingly pertinent Wiretap Act or not at all, because that statute did not 
                                                                                                                           
 190 See Govt’s District Court Brief, supra note 65, at 22–23. For example, the Stored Com-
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31–32; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2012) (defining electronic communications). Furthermore, 
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and interception, not data at rest. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(4), 3124(a) (2012). 
 191 See Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 104–316, 
§ 126(b), 110 Stat. 3840 (amended 1996); Stored Communications Act, Pub. L. No. 109–162, 
§ 1171(a)(1), 119 Stat. 3123 (amended 2006). 
 192 See Radia, supra note 2. 
 193 Pell, supra note 72, at 538. 
 194 See San Bernardino Order Application, supra note 167, at 4–8 (explaining that the gov-
ernment is unable to bypass the passcode of the phone on its own, because of newer security fea-
tures, such as the auto-erase function after ten consecutive failed attempts and delays between 
failed attempts); Radia, supra note 2. 
 195 See Govt’s District Court Brief, supra note 65, at 4; In re Apple, Inc., Transcript of Oct. 
26, 2015, supra note 14, at 12. 
 196 See Govt’s District Court Brief, supra note 65, at 26. 
 197 See Going Dark Part I, supra note 80, at 14, 42; McCullagh, supra note 80. More recent 
hearings, conducted in July 2015 and February 2016, have explicitly addressed the issue of en-
crypted iPhones, but it is difficult to see how those very recent hearings provide support for the 
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generally Encryption Tightrope Hearing, supra note 84 (discussing full-disk encryption by default 
on smartphones); Going Dark Part II—Yates & Comey Statement, supra note 81 (same). 
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specifically cover the type of information being sought—non-content com-
munication.198 A similar “near miss” has occurred in the case with encrypt-
ed data at rest on user devices, as no statute specifically covers the mat-
ter.199 Despite the lack of coverage, Judge Orenstein concluded that Con-
gress chose not to confer decryption-assistance authority after sufficiently 
considering it by citing congressional hearings, the FBI’s draft of CALEA 
amendments in 2009, and recently proposed legislation as support.200 Con-
gressional hearings and proposed amendments should do nothing to effect 
the availability of the All Writs Act under established precedent.201 The ina-
bility to execute smartphone search warrants due to rapidly evolving com-
mercial encryption seems to be exactly the type of “statutory interstice” for 
which the Act’s invocation has been reserved.202 Furthermore, decryption-
assistance orders are “agreeable to the usages and principles of law” be-
cause they are not precluded by any constitutional provision, current statute, 
or common law principle when issued in conjunction with a valid search 
                                                                                                                           
 198 See N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 162–63, 165–67; Govt’s Reply Brief, supra note 189, at 23; 
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Wiretap Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2521 (1968) (regulating wiretaps in domestic criminal 
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defined as non-content information. See In re Application of U.S. for Order Authorizing (1) Instal-
lation and Use of Pen Register and Trap Device or Process (In re Application of U.S. (S.D. Tex)), 
441 F. Supp. 2d 816, 818–19, 830–31 (S.D. Tex. 2006). 
 199 See N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 162–63, 165–67; Govt’s District Court Brief, supra note 65, 
at 26. 
 200 See In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d at 363. See generally Encryption Tightrope Hearing, 
supra note 84 (discussing full-disk encryption by default on smartphones); Going Dark Part II—
Yates & Comey Statement, supra note 81 (same). The FBI amendments were never sent to any 
member of Congress, and the proposed bills from 2015 have not yet been voted on. See In re Ap-
ple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d at 363; see also Secure Data Act of 2015, S. 135, 114th Cong. (2015) 
(exempting mandates authorized under CALEA, 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1010 (2012)); Secure Data 
Act of 2015, H.R. 726, 114th Cong. (2015) (same). 
 201 See N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 165–67; In re Application for Location Info. (D. Md.), 849 
F. Supp. 2d at 580; Sousa, supra note 93, at 113–14; Portnoi, supra note 100, at 299; see also Pa. 
Bureau of Corr. v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 474 U.S. 34, 43 (1985) (holding the All Writs Act inappli-
cable where a “statute specifically addresses the particular issue at hand”); Zino Davidoff v. CVS, 
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Kerr, supra note 149. 
 202 See Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32 (2002) (“[T]he All Writs Act 
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warrant.203 Finally, Apple itself had purposefully designed the auto-wipe 
feature for iOS 7 to thwart the only alternative means of accessing a locked 
iPhone available to the government.204 Thus, sufficient exceptional circum-
stances are present to make a decryption-assistance order in this case neces-
sary to preserve the integrity of the court’s previously issued warrant.205 
B. Apples-to-Apples: Different All Writs Analysis Depending on the 
Device’s Operating System 
Due to the discretionary nature of the authority under the All Writs 
Act, its availability in this context as a matter of law does not mean that 
orders should be issued in every case.206 As the In re Apple, Inc. court noted 
in extensive dicta, the discretionary factors that have been interpreted out of 
New York Telephone Co., should ultimately determine whether an All Writs 
order is necessary and not unduly burdensome.207 Although the court in In 
re Apple, Inc. concluded that the requested order would be unduly burden-
some given the facts, for a number of reasons, other courts could and have 
found differently under the same or similar circumstances.208 It would be 
                                                                                                                           
 203 See Perry, 360 F.3d at 533; see also In re Order Requiring XXX, Inc. to Assist in Execu-
tion of Search Warrant by Unlocking Cellphone (In re XXX, Inc.), No. 14 Mag. 2258, 2014 WL 
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 204 See APPLE, INC., supra note 41, at 11; Govt’s District Court Brief, supra note 65, at 41. 
 205 See Pa. Bureau of Corr., 474 U.S. at 44; In re Application for Location Info. (D. Md.), 849 
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Tone (3d Cir.)), 610 F.2d 1148, 1157 (3d Cir. 1779) (same). 
 207 See In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d at 363–64, 368, 374–75 (citing N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 
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 208 See, e.g., In re XXX, Inc., 2014 WL 5510865, at *1–3 (issuing an All Writs Act order to com-
pel device manufacturer to assist in bypassing the lock screen of a smartphones); Orin Kerr, Opinion, 
Preliminary Thoughts on the Apple iPhone Order in the San Bernardino Case: Part 2, the All Writs 
Act, WASH. POST (Feb. 19, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/
2016/02/19/preliminary-thoughts-on-the-apple-iphone-order-in-the-san-bernardino-case-part-2-the-
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much more difficult, however, to rectify the burdensomeness of an assis-
tance order seeking access to a phone running iOS 8 or higher, because Ap-
ple would most likely have to develop new software or handover source 
code to the government in order to comply.209 Aside from the potential First 
Amendment implications, such an order would present more than a minimal 
level of disruption to Apple’s overall operations, as it would require more 
research and development than the mere physical labor required to assist 
with pre-iOS 8 devices.210 ‘It is well within the courts’ authority to continue 
issuing decryption-assistance orders under the All Writs Act as long as the 
burden of compliance imposed on Apple remains relatively minimal.211 
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 210 See N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 174–75. In re Pen Register or Touch-Tone (3d Cir.), 610 
F.2d at 1155; San Bernardino Amicus Brief, supra note 168, at 4–14; Kerr, supra note 149. 
 211 See N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 172. According to estimates, iOS 8 and higher is currently 
running on 95% of Apple devices, and on at least four out of those twelve targeted devices at issue 
in the nine pending All Writs assistance orders across the federal jurisdictions. See Letter from 
Apple in Response to Court’s February 16, 2016 Order at 2, In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d 341 
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C. Expand CALEA to Require Cellphone Manufacturers to Maintain 
Decryption Capabilities When Presented with a Search Warrant 
One long-term solution to the device-encryption problem could be to 
amend and expand CALEA to cover smartphone manufacturers, by requir-
ing telecommunications carriers to retain certain decryption capabilities for 
devices running on their networks.212 For example, this could be done by 
adding a fifth capability requirement to § 1002(a) that mandates telecom-
munications carriers to ensure that wireless devices sold for use on their 
networks are amenable to search warrant executions.213 This would be con-
sistent with the congressional intent underlying the original enactment of 
CALEA because the mandate would only directly apply to telecomm carri-
ers, and actual access would still be predicated on an independently ob-
tained warrant.214 It would only indirectly apply to smartphone manufactur-
ers through § 1005, which requires manufacturers to cooperate with tele-
comm carriers’ CALEA compliance efforts.215 Moreover, this would not 
necessarily extend CALEA to include all electronic communication ser-
vices, something that Congress explicitly rejected with the original bill, be-
cause an entity could remain excluded insofar as it provides “information 
                                                                                                                           
 212 See FINKLEA, supra note 6, at 7, 10–11. 
 213 See 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a). For example, Verizon Wireless, a covered carrier under CALEA, 
sells iPhones on its website and in its stores for use on the Verizon network under the terms of 
service plans provided by Verizon. See Apple Smartphones, VERIZON WIRELESS, http://www.
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Verizon Wireless, 19 FCC Rcd. 22544, 22547 (Nov. 16, 2004) [hereinafter FCC Opinion Letter] 
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obligation to comply with CALEA). 
 214 See H.R. REP. NO. 103-827, pt. 1, at 18 (1994). Congress narrowed the scope of CALEA’s 
compliance requirements to telecomm carriers, and explicitly excluded information services to 
accommodate privacy concerns and avoid wide-sweeping technological impediments. See id. at 
18–19. CALEA’s stated purpose, however, was to preserve the government’s ability to intercept 
communications that use advanced technology. See id. at 9. Thus, the statutory scheme reflects a 
balancing of interests; for example, application of compliance was limited to common carriers 
because they were entities that law enforcement most regularly served with surveillance orders. 
See id. at 18. Congress noted that a broader approach that included all providers of electronic 
communication services would not be practical, nor would it be justified to meet any law en-
forcement need. Id. This rationale also presumed that other services could be wiretapped pursuant 
to court order, which they must cooperate with under existing law. Id. 
 215 47 U.S.C. § 1005. As it is currently written, requires manufacturers of telecomm transmis-
sion equipment, which ostensibly includes Apple, to make available such features or modifications 
necessary to allow covered carriers to comply with capability requirements under § 1002(a). 
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services.”216 Furthermore, § 1002(b)(2)’s encryption exemption would be 
amended to also cover equipment manufacturers.217 This would exempt car-
riers and manufacturers from being responsible for decrypting communica-
tions and devices encrypted by a subscriber or customer, but would require 
decryption assistance if the encryption was provided by that carrier or man-
ufacturer.218 
With this solution, the government is only mandating access in the 
general sense, rather than a specific access point that may contain untenable 
privacy vulnerabilities.219 Allowing the private industry to come up with the 
most viable solution on its own terms, rather than mandating a specific key 
system would still allow for innovation and competition in the cryptology 
field.220 This notion of requiring private entities to maintain capabilities to 
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 217 See 47 U.S.C. § 1002(b)(3). 
 218 See id. This would be consistent with original congressional intent to avoid limitations on 
subscribers’ rights to use encryption, but would preclude a device manufacturer like Apple from 
refusing to assist the government in decrypting software or hardware that it designed itself. See 
H.R. REP. NO. 103-827, at 18, 24. 
 219 See H.R. REP. NO. 103-827, at 23; FINKLEA, supra note 6, at 10. This approach may be 
preferable to other potential legislative solutions, such as a Key Escrow or Key Disclosure type of 
statute. See Atwood, supra note 64, at 431–33 (discussing key escrow and key disclosure statutes 
as possible solutions to the encryption problem); Corn, supra note 10, 1444–50 (advocating for a 
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39, at 470 (arguing that any type of comprehensive encryption regulation could harm cybersecuri-
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 220 See H.R. REP. NO. 103-827, at 23. Moreover, the amendment could be implemented over a 
four-year transition period to allow carriers and device manufacturers to develop means of com-
pliance, as the original act did. See H.R. REP. NO. 103-827, at 16–18. One of the original purposes 
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tion. See van Hoboken & Rubinstein, supra note 50, at 529. Under the scheme of this proposed 
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comply with court-ordered government searches is not a novel concept.221 
By narrowly tailoring the amendment to meet this new challenge posed by 
advanced encryption technology, and allowing the industry itself to deter-
mine the terms of compliance, the amendment would be fairly consistent 
with the original congressional intent.222 
CONCLUSION 
The debate over cellphone encryption should ultimately be settled 
through legislation. Until then, the judiciary should be empowered to use 
the All Writs Act to preserve its jurisdiction where it would not be unduly 
burdensome to compel assistance. The Going Dark issue may indeed pose 
as a serious, real-time impediment to the public safety in the reasonably 
foreseeable future, or continue to proliferate as a tangential threat by mak-
ing it more difficult for law enforcement to investigate and prosecute crimi-
nals. But more significant is the threat that this type of uncompromising 
technology, which has the potential to directly nullify the warrant require-
ment in an ever-expanding context, poses to the viability of the American 
criminal justice system. The Supreme Court has repeatedly noted that the 
hallmark of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness. Just as it is reasona-
ble to require authorities to obtain lawful authorization prior to conducting a 
search, it should be reasonable to require access once that authorization is 
obtained. 
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amendment, third-party app encryption services, as well as end-to-end Internet encryption ser-
vices, such as e-mail, would not need to ensure decryption capability. 
 221 See van Hoboken & Rubinstein, supra note 50, at 529. 
 222 See H.R. REP. NO. 103-827, at 16, 18; supra note 218 and accompanying text (discussing 
the legislative intent underlying CALEA’s original enactment in 1994). 
